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I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally uncontroverted that the corporation is an artificial
person with independent legal status. Indeed, much of corporate law
is built upon this notion of the corporation as a separate entity. How-
ever, this conception of the corporation is only accurate on a superfi-
cial level. Recent corporate law scholarship seeks to remove
conventional assumptions about corporate identity and, instead, criti-
cally examine what is meant by the corporate persona.1 Critical
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. I am grateful to
Robert Rasmussen, Nicholas Zeppos, Thomas Hazen, Robert Belton, Michael D. Newsom,
David Millon, William Bratton, and Deborah Watts Hill for their constructive comments on
an earlier draft of this article. I also benefited from the comments of my colleagues during a
Life of the School ("LOTS") program at Vanderbilt University School of Law. Adolpho A.
Birch III, Class of 1991, and Olivia Walling, Class of 1991, provided valuable research
assistance. Responsibility for the theories contained in this Article, however, rests with the
author.
1. The term "corporate persona" is a shorthand reference to the corporation's theoretical
conception. It has been used to suggest that there is a context of moral values that may be
imposed on corporations as well as on individuals. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate
Persona, Contract Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1991) (examining
shortcomings of the contractarian model when moral values are imposed upon corporations).
I use this term because the First Amendment tends to broaden the perspective of any debate
into which it is injected. With the corporation, the First Amendment motivates consideration
of the social, as well as the economic, implications of corporate regulation.
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inquiry into the nature of the corporate persona has important policy
consequences.2 A conception of the corporation as a creature of the
state obviously suggests a different regulatory environment than one
that views the corporation as a naturally occurring vehicle for collab-
orative private action. Debate over the nature of the corporate per-
sona has illuminated the full range of corporate law questions. An
important area left largely unexamined in this debate, however, is the
significance of the conception of the corporate persona in determining
the constitutional protection that should appropriately be afforded
corporate speech.
Typically, the treatment of a human activity under the First
Amendment generates an examination of that specific activity. The
recent spate of prominent First Amendment questions amply illus-
trate this proposition. In the flag burning cases, courts scrutinized the
act of burning a flag to determine its expressive content.3 Similarly, in
the recent obscenity cases involving Robert Mappelthorpe's homo-
erotic photographs and the lyrics of the rap music group 2 Live Crew,
the question of whether First Amendment protection precluded state
regulation focused not on questions of First Amendment doctrine but
on the character of the expression.4
Interestingly, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,5 the
2. See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 232-40
(reviewing debate over corporate legal theory in context of the hostile takeover boom of
1980s); John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival
of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 835-44 (1989).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2407-08 (1990) (holding that flag
burning, as an act of expression, enjoys First Amendment protection); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 406 (1989); United States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415, 421 (W.D. Wash. 1990)
(holding that the Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 700 (West Supp. 1990)), violated the First Amendment when applied to
defendants charged with flag burning during demonstration protesting the Act's enactment).
4. In Contemporary Arts Ctr. v. Ney, 735 F. Supp. 743, 744 (S.D. Ohio 1990), after the
gallery and certain of its principals were indicted on charges of obscenity but before any
judicial determinations had been made, the plaintiffs had to seek an injunction to prevent the
seizure of Robert Mapplethorpe's homoerotic photographs, which had been displayed at the
gallery. The gallery's operators ultimately were exonerated when the jury found that the
exhibit was not obscene.
The lyrics of the album, Nasty as They Wanna Be, prompted a criminal conviction for the
sale of obscene material. Two LIVE CREW, NASTY AS THEY WANNA BE (Luke Records
1989). The language of this album is admittedly unacceptable for certain audiences, yet over
two million copies have been sold. The album represents a genre of music which has its roots
in certain facets of African-American culture. Its treatment raises the question whether
certain forms of communication, particularly those that do not derive from majoritarian
culture, will be allowed to thrive. Much of the debate on this matter has focused upon the
underlying question of our commitment to and understanding of cultural diversity. See, e.g.,
Henry L. Gates, Jr., 2 Live Crew Decoded, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1990, at A23. Therefore, the
issue became which characterization of the activity-speech would the judge respect.
5. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
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Court upheld limitations on corporate speech in the form of contribu-
tions and independent expenditures on behalf of state political candi-
dates without focusing on the appropriate characterization of the
activity involved-that is, whether the corporate form of doing busi-
ness6 affected the relevant First Amendment doctrine.
Austin is the Court's most recent statement on the extent of First
Amendment protection accorded corporate speech. Implicit in the
opinions of both Austin and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti7
is a disagreement among the justices as to the appropriate theoretical
conception of the corporate persona. This disagreement is critical,
because one's theory of the firm affects the First Amendment analysis
and therefore the protection afforded to the speech. The Court's lack
of direct analysis of corporate theory raises the question of the proper
role for corporate legal theory in resolving issues that involve the
First Amendment and corporate participation in public discourse.
Recently, several scholars have debated the relationship between
corporate theory, doctrine, and practice. Morton Horwitz8 asserted
that corporate legal theory helped to legitimize the development of
large corporate entities shortly after the turn of the century. He also
argued, in part as a response to the characterization of legal concepts
as indeterminate or as simply a function of the interpreter's view-
point,9 that corporate legal theory is not "infinitely flippable" and has
6. The term "corporate speech" generally refers to speech made on behalf of the
corporation, whereas "commercial speech" refers to speech concerning consumer affairs. See
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627,
634-38 (1990) (discussing differences that Supreme Court has found between commercial and
non-commercial speech); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations
Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v.
Belotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1351 (explaining centrality of source of communication in context
of corporate speech). Individuals, partnerships, and corporations can engage in commercial
speech; corporate speech, however, involves speech funded by or prepared within the corporate
structure that injects the corporation into the polity. If corporate theory is to be useful in
determining the extent of First Amendment protection, the analysis must identify the
particular source of the speech, not merely the business irrespective of form.
7. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
8. Professor Horwitz is a legal historian and participant in the critical legal studies
movement. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1491 n.96 (1989); Wythe Holt, Morton
Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal History, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663,
667-68 (1982).
9. This is a position espoused by many within the critical legal studies movement. See,
e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997,
1000, 1006-07 (1985) (arguing that, because doctrinal structure cannot reconcile tension
between competing values, critical discourse favors one viewpoint over others and promotes
indeterminacy of legal theory); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-25 (1984) (discussing the fallacy that legal theory should
always produce determinate results); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement,
1991]
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determinate potential.1° William Bratton and David Millon have
challenged Horwitz's positions by questioning his suggestion that cor-
porate theory drives doctrine and practice. 1 Instead, they argue that
the determination of theory, doctrine, and practice is a dynamic,
interactive process in which each element both generates causes and
effects and responds to the causes and effects of the other elements.
Neither of these scholars, however, doubt Horwitz's basic assertion
that corporate legal theory is a significant component in the more
dynamic process that they envisage.
This debate about the determinant relationship between corpo-
rate legal theory, corporate law doctrine, and corporate practice is
directly relevant to the question of how the First Amendment should
apply to expressions funded by and prepared within the corporate
structure. At the intersection of the First Amendment and corporate
law is a similar dynamic involving First Amendment doctrine and
corporate legal theory. The heightened significance of corporate legal
theory in this context is based on two precepts. First, it seems to be a
logical requirement that one characterize the entity calling for First
Amendment protection before constitutional protection can be ascer-
tained. First Amendment rights are not so broad as to protect speech
irrespective of its source. The Court has made clear that the source of
the speech may be relevant, as in the case of children's speech and
corporate speech. 2
Second, allowing the separate incorporation of business ventures
clearly was intended to aid the accumulation and allocation of
resources for the achievement of desirable commercial goals. Corpo-
rate dominance in the commercial sphere, however, has affected soci-
ety in many other, non-commercial respects. The resolution of
concerns about the societal role of the corporation are informed by
and, to some extent, are dependent upon the perceived contours of its
theoretical conception. Therefore, in areas where basic commercial
concerns are not the focus of debate, one's conception of the corpora-
tion takes on greater significance. In the First Amendment context,
questions of corporate law doctrine and practice are fairly remote,
and normative concerns involving the appropriate role of the corpora-
tion in society rise to the fore.
96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 567-76 (1983) (criticizing leftist legal thought for its subjective
interpretation and rejection of all tenets of formalism and objectivism).
10. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 175-76 (1985) (stating that "most important controversial legal
abstractions do have determinate legal or political significance").
11. Bratton, supra note 8, at 1511-13; Millon, supra note 2, at 241-51.
12. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
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In both Austin and Bellotti, the Court had to consider the proper
interpretation of the First Amendment,13 but equally it had to con-
sider the proper characterization of the corporation. Because not all
organizations or groups of individuals are treated identically under
the First Amendment, 4 and because the application of First Amend-
ment principles to corporations requires some special analysis, an
underlying fundamental question begs to be answered: "What are
corporations?"
This Article considers the relevant academic theories of the cor-
poration, examines the theory of the firm implicit in the various opin-
ions rendered in the corporate speech cases, and suggests a theoretical
perspective of the corporation which informs how First Amendment
law should address corporate speech. Part II reviews the various cor-
porate theories that have developed since the corporate form became
generally accessible in America. Part III dissects the opinions in Bel-
lotti and Austin in an effort to demonstrate how the theories described
in Part II have been adopted by the Justices. Part IV considers the
impact of these theories on the outcomes of the various opinions.
Finally, Part V explores the appropriate role of corporate theory and
its selection in the context of First Amendment questions.
13. Much has been written about the scope and meaning of First Amendment protections
in the context of corporate speech. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and
Stockholders' Rights under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981); Paul G. Chevigny,
Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 157, 189-90 (1980); Ronald
K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 1087 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Francis H. Fox, Corporate Political Speech: The
Effect of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti upon Statutory Limitations on Corporate
Referendum Spending, 67 KY. L.J. 75 (1979); Gary Hart & William Shore, Corporate
Spending on State and Local Referendums: First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 29 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 808 (1979); O'Kelley, supra note 6; William Patton & Randau Bartlett,
Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981
Wis. L. REV. 494 (1981); Lionel S. Sobel, First Amendment Standards of Government
Subsidies of Artistic and Cultural Expression: A Reply to Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, 41
VAND. L. REV. 517 (1988); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 46 (1987); Paul G. Stern, Note, A Pluralistic Reading of the First Amendment and Its
Relation to Public Discourse, 99 YALE L.J. 925 (1990); Note, The Content Distinction in Free
Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (1989). However, the corporate
theory perspective has not been developed.
14. While such unequal treatment would render irrelevant the selection of a corporate
theoretical conception under the First Amendment, it actually suggests a conception of the
corporation as an aggregation of its members. Such a conception indicates that all
organizations be treated similarly.
1991]
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II. REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE
LEGAL THEORY
Because corporations are conceptually complex,' 5 both lawyers
and lay persons have reified the corporation as an entity. 16 This in
turn has led to the acceptance of the "fictional entity" description of
the corporation.'" While the curious use of such an oxymoron' s may
15. William Bratton uses the following language to capture the complexity of the
corporate concept:
Firms are bundles of unruly phenomena. They entail not just production,
but production by groups of people. Therefore, theories designed to contain and
regularize the appearance of firms go beyond concepts about economic
production to articulate concepts about communities. These concepts variously
distinguish the individual and the group, usually according the interests of one or
the other greater moment.
William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 COR-
NELL L. REV. 407, 407 (1989).
16. The tendency to reify the corporation has been aptly described with the following
language:
Both lawyers and lay persons tend to speak instinctively of the corporation
as an 'it'-that is, as a thing that has an identity and existence of its own. While
this is sometimes a helpful shorthand form of expression... corporations should
not be analyzed in this fashion, except when the complexity of the actual
relationships becomes so unmanageable as to make it unnecessary to reify....
This statement may seem confusing, because it is clear that the law, itself, does
not do this. In general, the corporation is reified .... That is, the law conceives
of the corporation as having an existence separate from that of its employees,
customers, suppliers, and so forth-but mainly, from its shareholders.
Sometimes, to be sure, the corporation is called a "fictional" entity-in apparent
recognition of the abstract and potentially misleading nature of the concept.
Still, there is the basic notion of a barrier, a psychological wall, between the
shareholder (and other participants in the venture) and the corporation ...
Sometimes the process goes a step further. The fictional (conceptual) entity
becomes a putative person-capable, for example, of committing a crime or of
bearing the burden of a tax. In other words, reification sometimes leads to
anthropomorphism-that is, treating the corporation as if it were a human being.
WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 101-02 (1990) (emphasis added).
17. The terms "legal fiction" or "artificial entity" do not explain the actual nature of the
corporation or how such an entity fits into the confines of our society. However, the terms are
imbedded deeply in the law. As to legal persons, Blackstone notes that "[niatural persons are
such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human
laws for the purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies
politic." 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 724 (1961) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1765-69); see also Sanford A. Schane, The
Corporation is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 564 (1987)
(discussing influence of Blackstone's characterization of corporate personality on American
law).
18. The word "entity" has been defined as "something that has a real existence."
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 649 (2d ed. 1987). Fictional, on
the other hand, has been defined as "something feigned, invented, or imagined." Id. at 713.
The definitions would suggest, at least facially, that "fictional entity" is oxymoronic.
[Vol. 46:317
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provide a shorthand point of reference,' 9 a more accurate conceptual-
ization of the corporation is necessary for the application of First
Amendment principles to expressions which are prepared within and
funded by the corporate structure.
Corporate law literature has focused extensively upon the theo-
retical characterization of the corporation. It has been unsuccessful,
however, in creating any enduring view. Over time the various char-
acterizations of the corporation have infused debates about corporate
policy. These debates generally assumed a particular theoretical char-
acterization of the corporation and, therefore, were bound within that
particular paradigm.20 As social, political, economic, and doctrinal
circumstances change, however, the accepted paradigm of the corpo-
ration has evolved and corporate policy debates have assumed new
theoretical constructs.
William Bratton has suggested that the evolution of legal theory
over the better part of two centuries consistently has revolved around
three or four fundamental questions.21 Each of the theories developed
to date can be defined by its position regarding these essential ques-
tions concerning the nature of the corporate persona: (1) whether the
corporation should be viewed as an entity or an aggregate of its par-
ticipants; (2) whether the corporation owes its creation to a conces-
sion from the state or to the motivation of the individual
entrepreneurs; and (3) whether the corporation is appropriately char-
acterized, legally, as a public or private phenomenon.22 Historically,
19. Professors Klein and Coffee have noted that "[w]hile this [characterization] is
sometimes a helpful shorthand form of expression, a basic message of [their] book is that
corporations should not be analyzed in this fashion, except when the complexity of the actual
relationships becomes so unmanageable as to make it necessary to reify." KLEIN & COFFEE,
supra note 16, at 101. They aptly point out that shorthand references should be used only
when a more precise characterization becomes useless due to its complexity.
20. See infra note 23 for a discussion of the current debate over the interrelationship
between practice and theory in corporate law.
21. Throughout the evolution of corporate theory, the theories that have attained
dominance for any period of time have seemed to respond differently to this fixed set of
questions. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 2, at 829, 841-42 (explaining how different corporate
theories have been dominant at different times in our history).
22. Bratton describes these enduring questions in terms of pairs of opposing concepts.
Bratton, supra note 8, at 1510-13. This Article makes reference to only three of the four pairs
that Bratton identifies. Not included is the fourth pair, which characterizes the nature of the
contracts in which the corporation is engaged as either discrete or relational. While this
conceptual conflict exists now and may continue in the future, it has not had the same overt
historical significance on the debate because the relational theory of contracts has been
articulated only recently.
Millon recognizes that theorists traditionally examined corporate legal theory in two
dimensions, the aggregate-entity dimension and the creation dimension. He describes the
latter as the dimension that considers "the distinction between the corporation as an artificial
creation of state law and the corporation as a natural product of private initiative." Millon,
1991]
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these concepts have been components of the corporate legal theories
espoused by various judges, scholars, politicians, and business persons
who have opined about particular issues within the field of corporate
law and policy.
Although there is some disagreement among legal historians as
to the reasons for the rise and fall of the various corporate legal theo-
ries,23 there is fair agreement that the rise and fall of each theory coin-
cides with changes in other relevant circumstances, such as the
corporate practice techniques and legal doctrines accepted at the time;
the political, social, and economic situation; and the prevalent theo-
retical schools of thought on economic, political, and social issues.2 4
supra note 2, at 201. He describes the additional dichotomy of the public-private distinction,
which he suggests "operated at a deeper level, explicitly and implicitly structuring thought
about the nature of corporate activity and the appropriate goals of corporate law." Id.
23. Horwitz considers theory potentially determinative of corporate practice:
I wish to deny that legal conceptions are infinitely 'flippable' and instead to insist
that they have 'tilt' or influence in determining outcomes. Thus, for example, I
wish to dispute Dewey's conclusion that particular conceptions of corporate
personality were just as easily used to limit as to enhance corporate power.
Instead, I hope to show that, for example, the rise of 'natural entity' theory of the
corporation was a major factor in legitimating big business and that none of the
other theoretical alternatives could provide as much sustenance to newly
organized concentrated enterprises.
Horwitz, supra note 10, at 176. Bratton accepts the "temporal confluences of theory and prac-
tice," but he questions whether the proximity in time can conclusively establish the direction
of the causal link. Bratton, supra note 8, at 1510-17.
Most recently, Millon has questioned both perspectives, asserting that the relationships
between practice and theory are too interrelated to establish causation in either direction. Mil-
lon, supra note 2, at 204. He states:
These legal theories are based on positive or descriptive assertions about the
world-assertions about what corporations are. In a characteristic form of legal
argument, normative implications then are said to follow from the positive asser-
tion. However, at the same time that theory is influencing doctrine, theories of
the corporation themselves are influenced strongly by legal doctrine defining the
corporation's attributes. The relationship between legal theories of the corpora-
tion and corporate doctrine is thus dynamic and interdependent: Each simulta-
neously influences the other. Our ideas about what corporations are provide us
with a critical perspective toward corporate doctrine, while our interpretation of
corporate doctrine reveals what appears to be [the essence] of corporations.
Id. at 204. I would assert that our conceptions of corporations provide a critical perspective
for the application of First Amendment doctrine as well.
24. For example, the rise of the neoclassical economic view of the corporation, which
seemed to reach its zenith in the 1980s, was fueled by the development of the high risk, high
yield "junk bond" market, which in turn fueled the market for corporate control. Similarly,
the prevalence of supply-side economic theories of government also may have promoted the
neoclassical conception of the corporation. It is yet to be seen how the recent collapse of the
junk bond market will affect the level of acceptance of various corporate theories. However,
the recently realized power of states to retard control transactions may have precipitated the
rise of a new conception-the stakeholder vision of the corporation. Millon has demonstrated
that corporate theory and doctrine, over time, have oscillated between a public orientation and
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These theoretical perspectives from other fields resonate with corpo-
rate theory and with the changes in practice and doctrine to promote
an evolving conception of the corporation.25 The relevance and
meaning of each particular theory, therefore, is dependent upon the
historical context within which it achieved general acceptance.
Although corporate legal theories provide a useful foundation for the
application of law to corporations, they are, at least to some extent,
bound to the period in which their general acceptance defined the
parameters of debate. The chronological description which follows
provides the proper orientation for understanding the reasons behind
their rise and applicability.
A. The Fictional Entity Theory
The first relevant theory or paradigm of the corporate persona
predominated from approximately 1780 until 1890.26 It reflected the
theoretical perspective of a period when corporate chartering was lim-
ited strictly to special concessions from the legislature. The charters
issued during this period restricted corporate accumulation of eco-
nomic power in several ways. These restrictions included limitations
on both the duration and the capitalization of corporations as well as
the requirement for and enforcement of specific single corporate-pur-
pose descriptions in the context of a rather narrow application of the
ultra vires doctrine."
This first theory-the fictional entity theory-focused primarily
upon the corporation's relationship with the state. The state's per-
a private orientation. Millon, supra note 2, at 205-34. If this is true, corporate legislation may
be headed toward more of a public orientation in the near future.
25. Conceptual evolution is hardly new to constitutional theory. Compare Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942) (finding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not
fundamental right), with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (finding right to counsel
is a fundamental right). Typically, however, conceptual evolution, when examined in the
constitutional sphere, focuses on the evolution of a legal principal. Here, I am arguing that
there must be a mature conception of the nature of the corporation for the application of a
given constitutional principle. A more concrete example is the area of cruel and unusual
punishment, where it has been noted that "the Court has not interpreted [the cruel and
unusual punishment] provision in a purely historical or static manner, but has accepted the
concept that it must develop over time." John B. Wefing, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 20
SETON HALL L. REV. 478, 484 (1990). In early America, for example, flogging represented
neither cruel nor unusual punishment, but today such punishment would not be acceptable.
Although neither the constitutional language nor the activity have changed, our contemporary
understanding of the nature and effects of such punishment have changed the way in which we
apply the law to the facts.
26. JAMES W. HURST, From Special Privilege to General Utility 1780-1890, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 13-57
(1970).
27. See id. at 37-44.
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ceived dominance over the corporate form2" was such that, as Willard
Hurst has noted, "[t]he standard formula spoke as if the state not only
gave an indispensable consent but itself created the whole working
reality of any business association which took corporate form."2 An
example can be seen in the language of Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward,a° which was replete with references to the artificiality of
the corporate persona and its subservience to state law.3  The lan-
guage of this case is recognized as emblematic of the prevailing theory
during this period.3 2 As a result, the debate during this era focused
on the effects associated with public control of corporate affairs.3
B. The Natural Entity Theory
The second paradigm, the natural entity theory, developed in the
1890s. While the natural entity theory still appears in modem litera-
28. Corporate law during this period strongly favored public regulation of corporate
activity. See Millon, supra note 2, at 211 (arguing that extensive regulation evidenced a
distrust for corporations generally and was, therefore, reflected in 19th century theory).
29. HURST, supra note 26, at 9.
30. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
31. Id. at 636.
32. Chief Justice Marshall stated: "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence." Id. Hurst indicated that Marshall borrowed
this language from Coke and Blackstone. HURST, supra note 26, at 9. Even though the
Dartmouth College Court limited the states' authority to modify the corporate contract when it
had not reserved such a right, states shortly overcame this setback by passing statutes that
explicitly reserved their right to change the corporate charter. In any event, this episode did
not change the general perception of the time that corporations were creatures of state law.
See generally Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation,
55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 774-75 (1989) (explaining that, even after Dartmouth College,
corporations were considered artificial beings which owed their existence to special legislative
acts).
33. This entity orientation has been deeply embedded in the Supreme Court's analysis of
corporations. See, e.g., Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). In Berea, the Court
found constitutional that portion of a Kentucky statute which made it illegal for corporations
to educate "white and colored children" together. Id. at 55. In fact, the statute made it illegal
for "any person, corporation or association" to do so, but the Court was confronted with a
case involving only a corporation. Id. at 54. The Court's analysis clarifies its assumption that
though the Constitution precludes such a statute relating to individuals, it presents no similar
impediment to the regulation of corporations. Clearly, the Court adopted a fictional entity
conception of the corporation. Justice Harlan noted in dissent,
In so ruling, it must necessarily have been assumed by this court that the
legislature may have regarded the teaching of white and colored pupils at the
same time and in the same school or institution, when maintained by private
individuals and associations, as wholly different in its results from such teaching
when conducted by the same individuals acting under the authority of or
representing a corporation.
Id. at 61.
[Vol. 46:317
CORPORATE LEGAL THEORY
ture, it seems to have lost its dominance, at least in the academic com-
munity. a4 Unlike its predecessor, this model rejected the notion of
state dominance and conceded the significance of the individual initia-
tive required to create a corporation. a5 After a period, 6 the focal
point of debate within this paradigm became the moral basis and
legitimacy of management's control over the corporate entity. The
issue of management legitimation became an important concern as
large "management corporations" proliferated.3 7  The natural entity
34. Actually, the debate over natural entity theory seemed to cease in the late 1930s.
While the corporate persona debate receded to relative obscurity until the 1980s, corporate
policy analysis and discussion continued to assume a natural entity paradigm. Horwitz notes:
For almost forty years after 1890, American jurists, like their German, French,
and English counterparts, were preoccupied with the theory of the corporation,
or, as it was then frequently called, with corporate personality. Then the issue
suddenly vanished from controversy. The last great analysis of the question,
which is sometimes thought to have permanently put it to rest, appeared in the
1926 Yale Law Journal article, by the philosopher John Dewey. Writing in
sympathy with the powerful contemporaneous Legal Realist attack on
"conceptualism," Dewey sought to show that theories of corporate personality
were infinitely manipulable and that at different times the same theories had been
used both to expand and to limit not only corporate but trade union powers.
Horwitz, supra note 10, at 175; see also HURST, supra note 26, at 73 (explaining change in
states' attitudes toward corporations during 1930s); Bratton, supra note 8, at 1491 (discussing
criticism of corporate realism that occurred in 1920s and its demise).
35. Around the turn of the century, states began to eliminate many of the restrictive
provisions governing corporations, such as limitations on capitalization and limitations on the
power to own stock of other corporations. This loosening of the reins by state law and the
corresponding development of large corporate entities spawned a debate regarding the nature
of the corporate personality. See, e.g., W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation
and the State, 21 LAW Q. REV. 365 (1905); George F. Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the
Corporate Entity Theory, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 128 (1917); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Nature of
Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corporate Debts, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 285 (1909); Harold
J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916); Arthur W. Machen,
Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911).
36. Initially, the debate focused on the appropriate conception of the corporation after the
relaxation of state control. One approach was to characterize corporations as aggregates
similar to partnerships. This approach resolved the question of whether corporations were
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment on the theory that courts, and indeed the
Constitution, should allow individuals the same rights through the corporate form as they
would maintain in any other group. See, e.g., Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118
U.S. 394, 396 (1886); The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 747-48 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885); see
also O'Kelley, supra note 6, at 1352-59 (arguing that Justice Field's rationale in Railroad Tax
Cases could adequately explain BellottO. The opposing theory derived largely from European
scholars and endorsed the impact of group dynamics over the contributions of individuals to
the corporate venture. This theory reinforced the characterization of the corporation as an
entity. See Bratton, supra note 8, 1489-91 nn.81-90 (discussing how entity theory obtained
dominance over European ideas about group life); Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The
Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. Pirr. L. REV. 575, 579-82
(1989). Ultimately, the recognition that shareholders were losing the battle for control of the
corporate activities to management buttressed the entity view of the corporation.
37. Bratton uses the term "management corporations," as opposed to the term "collective
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model reflected the general attitude that neither states nor sharehold-
ers could effectively check management's power over these massive
entities.38 The central question was whether management's position
of power could be justified in this context.39
C. The Aggregate Theory'
Building upon the theories initially presented by Ronald Coase in
capitalism" which was employed by Means, in order to avoid the political implications of
Means. The term describes the development of a management class within the corporate
structure, and anticipates the multiple layers and combinations of corporate entities within
that structure. Prior to this period, states tended to limit the amount of capital that could be
held by a corporation and precluded the ownership of stock in one corporation by another.
See GARDINER C. MEANS, THE CORPORATE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 50-51 (1962);
Bratton, supra note 8, at 1487 n.72 (explaining Means' analysis).
38. Interestingly, the cognates of the statute involved in Austin, as well as similar federal
statutes, were initially enacted during this era to "prohibit corporate contributions and
expenditures in connection with political elections." Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v.
Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397, 399 (W.D. Mich. 1986), rev'd, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
39. The landmark book, ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 277-87 (rev. ed. 1967), not only identified the
developing separation of ownership from control in the public corporations, but also argued
for a narrowing of the role of corporate directors in the mold of trust theory. See id. at 247-76;
see also Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1073
(1931) (explaining that powers given to management are designed to advantage all
shareholders); Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1368-70 (1932) (arguing that separation of ownership and control is
necessary and proper in a system where management's role is to maximize wealth). This view
was challenged by the notion that corporate directors should be corporate statesmen, acting as
trustees for the corporation rather than the shareholders, and respecting the corporation's
obligations to a broader segment of society. See E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153 (1932) (observing that separation of
ownership and control necessarily requires that managers act as trustees); E. Merrick Dodd, Is
Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L.
REV. 194 (1934); Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the
Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964).
40. I entitle this subsection "The Aggregate Theory," and the atomistic nature of its vision
substantially distinguishes it from the previously described theories. However, it is based upon
a set of neoclassical foundations, and its methodology in the law has been described as
contractarian. So the labels "neoclassical" or "contractarian" might also be applicable.
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the 1930s,41 economists42 and, subsequently, legal scholars43 began to
examine the corporation from a contractarian perspective, focusing
upon agency cost minimization as a justification for incorporation.
The corporation envisioned under this model, in its strongest form, is
not an entity at all." Instead, it is merely the focus for a set of con-
tractual agency arrangements-a nexus of contracts. Scholars who
adopted this view refuted the entity characterization of the corpora-
tion that had been a central theme of the previous theoretical mod-
els.45 Under this contractarian model, market mechanisms, as
41. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); see also Bratton,
supra note 8, at 408 n.3 (identifying connection between the 1937 Coase article and new
economic theory); Hazen, supra note 1, at 15 n.67.
42. See K. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organizations, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Steven S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, The Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & EON. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976); Vernon L. Smith, Economic Theory and Its Discontents, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 320
(1974).
43. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259
(1982); Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property
Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327 (1979); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law
and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983).
44. Bratton has actually discerned two schools of thought within the contractualist vision:
a weak version, typically described as "institutionalist," and a strong version, typically
described as "neoclassical." Bratton, supra note 15, at 411-17. As might be inferred from the
nomenclature, the institutionalists examine the corporation from a contractarian perspective
but accept the hierchical structure of the corporate form. Therefore, they retain, to some
degree, an entity perception of the corporation. The neoclassical counterpoint totally rejects
the significance of the institutional structure and tends to view corporations as comparable to
the market. However, even the institutionalist vision does not consider the corporation's entity
status in the sense in which it was previously accepted. Bratton notes:
The institutionalists ... developed a variant of contractualism .... The
opportunistic conduct and bounded rationality of their actors leave room for
tensions between individuals and corporate collectives that do not self-resolve.
Nonetheless, like the neoclassicists, their work offers normative comfort to
management interests. They legitimize the received hierarchical picture of the
management corporation as a contractual arrangement which minimizes
transaction costs.
Bratton, supra note 8, at 1500 (footnotes omitted).
45. The demise of fictional entity theory continued with changes in circumstances which
affected the actual nature of the corporate form. The conceptual differences between the
natural entity theory and the contractarian approach cannot be said to coincide with any such
changes in the corporation itself, but represent an interpretational dispute over the same set of
circumstances. The only other general model of the corporation to be reflected in the literature
is the power model described in Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Government:
Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH J.L. REF. 19 (1988). Dallas' model examines behavior
within the corporate structure and the potential effect of that behavior upon the actions of the
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opposed to the state or the original incorporators, control the intersti-
tial details of both day-to-day business and, via the market for corpo-
rate control, management of the corporation. The scholarly
examination of corporate regulation under this paradigm typically
scrutinizes regulatory choices to determine their effect on the eco-
nomic efficiency of the relationships that arise under the corporate
rubric. As a result, the aggregate theory discounts the significance of
the non-economic impact of corporations in society."
D. Why Choice of Theory is Important
While scholarly debate has evolved through the fictional entity,
natural entity, and contractarian (or aggregate entity) paradigms,
each paradigm has been defined by its position relative to three
aspects of the corporate persona: the entity/aggregate plane, the initi-
ative plane, and the legal characterization plane.47 As one might
corporation. Therefore, it does not erect a particular conception of the corporation, but still
may suggest certain normative implications.
46. For a reflection of the numerous articles analyzing various corporate law problems
from the perspective of the contractualist paradigm, see Bratton, supra note 8, at 1476 n.22.
There have been several notable critiques of this contractarian approach. See, e.g., Bratton,
supra note 8, at 1512-17 (arguing that strict adherence to contractarian model will fail to
depict corporate decision making accurately); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1404-05 (1985) (criticizing
contractarian model for its failure to examine degree of individual volition actually exercised
and individual's relative access to information); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (John W.
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887-88 (arguing contract doctrine is
inherently inconsistent with law governing fiduciary obligation); Hazen, supra note 1, at 36-43.
While the contractarian theory is not uniformly accepted in the academic community, this
litany indicates that those who disagree feel compelled to engage in the debate. After all,
framing the debate is all that can be asked of a dominant paradigm.
47. The following diagram illustrates this point:
THEORY
QUESTION Fictional Entity Natural Entity Contractarian
Entity/Aggregate Entity Entity Aggregate
Initiative Government Individual Individual
Legal Characterization Public ? Private
As this analysis reveals, fictional entity theory views incorporation primarily as establishing an
entity separate and apart from its owners, derived primarily from state grant. It therefore
legally characterizes the corporation as a public concern, subject to public control. Natural
entity theory generally accepts the entity aspect of corporateness, but presumes private action
initiates corporate existence instead of sovereign concession. Thus, this theory does not clearly
charactize the corporation as public or private. Contractarian (or aggregate entity) theory
exalts the private perspective of all three levels. It views corporations as merely the aggregate
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expect, there is less evidence of this ideological evolution among law-
yers and judges.48 For decisionmakers and commentators, however,
selection of a particular vision of the corporate persona significantly
affects policy considerations. The choice of a particular theoretical
conception of the corporation reflects one's view of the role of corpo-
rations in society and, consequently, one's normative view of the
world.
As Professor Roberta Romano argues, the corporate law policy
choices made by those in the academic community reflect their partic-
ular "world view."" Professor Romano develops a topology of demo-
cratic ideals which she suggests undergird corporate law scholarship.
Her thesis is that the position taken by a scholar on matters of corpo-
rate law scholarship, which generally tends to focus upon answers to
discrete regulatory questions, will be dictated by and categorized
under the "vision of the good society that informs their policy
package."5°
Professor Romano's point proves true in the corporate speech
area. For example, the neoclassical view of corporate legal theory
reasons, consistent with the conservative Chicago School ideology,
that since the corporation is merely a nexus for contracting, it is no
more obligated to be socially conscious than the stock market. As
might be expected, Justice Scalia endorses this conservative approach
in his dissent in Austin. 5
Corporate legal theory can be expected to significantly affect
one's thinking about how corporations should fit into the fabric of our
society and, ultimately, whether and how corporate speech should be
of or the nexus for individual relations that derive from private collective action and that ought
to be legally characterized as private concerns. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text
(describing Bratton's analysis of corporate legal theory under the entity/aggregate, initiative,
and legal characterization concepts).
48. As will be shown later, the Supreme Court continues to refer to each of these
paradigms as though it constitutes primary authority for the appropriate conception of the
corporation. See infra part III. As previously noted, the most prominent conceptual
understanding of the corporation among lawyers is that of a separate entity.
49. See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923,
1013 (1984).
50. Id. at 924. Romano's article attempts to lay out the various broad categories of
political ideas in a grid, which also maps corporate scholarship on particular matters of both
internal and external corporate regulation. See also David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate
Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979) (providing another effort to analyze the ends-
means relationship in corporate law scholarship).
51. However, the Austin case makes one recognize that anomalous results do occur. There
we find justices with world views as divergent as Justices Marshall and Brennan and Chief
Justice Rehnquist concurring in the majority opinion. This anomaly is probably more a matter
of coincidence than a convergence of normative vision.
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treated under the First Amendment.52 Indeed, scrutiny of the texts of
the Court's opinions that address corporate speech reveals that the
justices have, either consciously or unconsciously, adopted particular
theories. Ultimately, the justices differ sharply in their normative
visions.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S CORPORATE FREE
SPEECH DOCTRINE
Not until First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti did the Court
question whether the First Amendment protects corporate speech.53
In Bellotti, a state criminal statute prohibited corporations from mak-
ing contributions or expenditures to influence referenda not affecting
the corporation's business or assets.54  A group of corporations
brought a declaratory action challenging the statute under the First
Amendment. Applying First Amendment principles, the Court
rejected the state's asserted basis for its regulation. 55 While the jus-
tices generally agreed that corporations had a somewhat different
basis for asserting First Amendment rights than individuals, the Bel-
lotti majority found no principled basis for distinguishing between the
state's interests in limiting individual speech generally and its interest
in limiting corporate speech in this case. 56 Thus, Bellotti recognized
some corporate First Amendment rights.
Twelve years later, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
a majority of the Court established that, at a minimum, a corpora-
tion's First Amendment rights are not coterminous with those of
individuals.5 7 In Austin, the challenged state statute precluded corpo-
52. For a discussion of the appropriate approaches to theory selection for the corporate
free speech issue, see infra part IV.
53. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The Supreme Court had previously enforced First Amendment
protections where the protected party was a corporation. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778
n. 14 (listing series of cases holding state laws invalid as infringements on corporate speech);
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). However, the
question of whether corporations enjoyed First Amendment protections because of their status
as corporations had never been addressed. In Bellotti, the Court initially stated that issues
presented were matters of first impression, and rejected the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's characterization of the issue as a question of corporate rights. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767,
775-76, 777 n.13. The Court further found no "occasion to consider . . . whether, under
different circumstances, a justification for a restriction on speech that would be inadequate as
applied to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as applied to corporations."
Id.
54. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767-68.
55. Id. at 784-95.
56. Id. at 784.
57. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). The disparate treatment between corporations and individuals
appeared unlikely after Bellotti and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley,
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rations from making contributions to, or independent expenditures on
behalf of, state political candidates. Although the Court concluded
unanimously that the First Amendment did apply to the speech in
question, the majority upheld the state's limitation of corporate
speech.5" Austin, therefore, permitted what the Court in Bellotti had
strained to avoid-differential treatment of corporate speech and indi-
vidual speech under the First Amendment. The Court previously had
held that the ability of individuals, rich or otherwise, to contribute
funds to individual political campaigns could not, consistent with core
First Amendment values, be curtailed.59
The Austin Court determined that certain characteristics of cor-
porate status granted by state law gave corporations the potential to
amass "immense aggregations of wealth."' The Court's ultimate
concern, however, was the state's interest in protecting shareholders.
The Court wanted to protect the state's interest in ensuring that cor-
porate expenditures correlated with the political ideology of those
whose contributions made the accumulation of wealth possible. 61
Thus, the state's limitation of corporate contributions and independ-
ent expenditures overrode First Amendment concerns because of the
potential corruption resulting from a misalignment of shareholder
interest and corporate expenditures.62
corporations were treated in the same way as individuals; and, in Bellotti, the corporate right
was protected in the same manner as that of an individual. See Brice M. Clagett & John R.
Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and Its Prospects: The Constitutionality of
Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1375 (1976)
(article by two of plaintiff's lawyers in Buckley arguing for aggressive action by corporations,
taking position that their protections were coterminous with those of individuals).
58. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
59. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26 (finding state's interest in limiting actual or apparent
corruption sufficiently compelling to regulate corporate speech); Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1408-11
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for failing to follow Buckley's compelling state
interest test).
60. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397. Corporations are phenomenal capitalist vehicles. While
individuals and partnerships may come to control great wealth, the basic purpose of the
corporation has always been to serve as capital receptacles for particular purposes. Initially,
legislatures had to sanction these purposes specifically, but over time they dropped restrictions
on capital accumulation in favor of enhanced economic activity. HuRST, supra note 26.
61. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398. The Court did not address the issue of who should be in the
baseline constituency. Yet, this has been one of the defining questions for some time, and to
some extent, it traces the question, "What are corporations?"
62. The Court stated:
Regardless of whether this danger of "financial quid pro quo" corruption... may
be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures, Michigan's
regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.
Id. at 1397. The Court ultimately reasoned that the "unique state-conferred corporate struc-
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Rarely in any of the various opinions do the justices explicitly
address their conception of the corporate persona. Implicit, however,
in both Austin and Bellotti is a sharp disagreement over the appropri-
ate legal conception of the corporate persona. The concern for the
wishes of capital contributors and the potential miscorrelation
between their interests and the uses of the capital provided the basis
upon which the majority distinguished the rights of individuals from
the rights of corporations. Support for this rationale among the jus-
tices diverged on the basis of their inexplicit, but discernable, theories
of the corporation.
A. The Underlying Disagreement
1. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON V. BELLOTTI
In Bellotti, the Supreme Court avoided the issue of whether
speech loses its First Amendment protection "simply because its
source [was] a corporation."63 The Massachusetts State Legislature
engaged in an effort to establish a graduated individual income tax.64
Apparently the corporate interests in the state had opposed the mea-
sure. Therefore, the Legislature, consistent with its custom,
attempted to amend the statute to preclude corporations from partici-
pating in public debate of the referendum.6"
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court posed the threshold
issue of whether and to what extent the First Amendment applied to
corporate speech in this context.66 However, the United States
Supreme Court avoided altogether consideration of the relationship
between corporate status and First Amendment coverage. Neverthe-
ture that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrant[ed] the limit on independent
expenditures." Id. at 1398.
63. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784. The majority opinion sought to avoid this issue with the
following treatment of the lower court's decision:
We believe that the [lower] court posed the wrong question. . . . The First
Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests. The proper
question therefore is not whether corporations "have" First Amendment rights
and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead,
the question must be whether [the statute] abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect.
Id. at 776. In the end, however, the language of the opinion reveals that the nature of the
corporate entity had an impact on the Court's reasoning. Although the holdings in both Bel-
lotti and Buckley left open the possibility that no difference in treatment between individuals
and corporations may have existed, the Court's decision in Austin clearly establishes that
under First Amendment analysis individuals and corporations can be treated differently on a
constitutional level.
64. Id. at 769.
65. Cognates of the challenged statute date back to 1946. Id. at 769 n.3.
66. Id. at 769.
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less, the Court's response indicates that the majority inculcated a con-
ception of the corporation as a natural entity.
Both the lower court and the State of Massachusetts took the
position that the contours of established First Amendment doctrine
allowed the restrictions of corporate speech provided by the statute.67
The First Amendment theory they suggested came to be known as the
"materially affecting" theory.6" In rejecting the corporate plaintiffs'
request for a declaratory judgment striking down the statute, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court directly confronted the issue
of whether the First Amendment applied to corporations.69 The
67. Id. at 771-72, 781.
68. Id. at 781.
69. The corporate plaintiffs had argued, among other things, that the statute, both on its
face and as applied to them, violated the First Amendment and the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney
General (First Nat' Bank I), 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Mass. 1977), rev'd sub nom. First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). While it acknowledged that the state statute
"potentially implicate[d] the First Amendment," the Massachusetts court went on to note:
[A]ny distinction between 'speech' and 'conduct' . .. has no validity here....
But this premise does not reach a more basic question here involved, namely,
whether business corporations, such as the plaintiffs, have First Amendment
rights coextensive with those of natural persons or associations of natural
persons. Therefore, before we consider the plaintiffs' various claims, we must
first consider whether and to what extent corporations possess First Amendment
rights.
First Nat'l Bank II, 359 N.E.2d at 1269 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court, in its review
of this decision, characterized this language in the following way:
In addressing appellants' constitutional contentions, the court acknowledged that
[the statute] "operate[s] in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities," . . . and viewed the principal question as "whether business corpora-
tions, such as the [plaintiffs], have First Amendment rights coextensive with
those of natural persons or associations of natural persons."
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 771 (footnote omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976),
and First Nat'! Bank I, 359 N.E.2d at 1269). The Massachusetts court also stated:
It is undisputed that a corporation "is neither a citizen of a state nor of the
United States within the protection of the privileges and immunities clauses of
Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment." . . . Fur-
thermore, it has been stated that "[t]he liberty referred to in [the Fourteenth]
Amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons." . . . But there are
limits on the extent to which corporations may be totally deprived of what would
be considered due process "liberty" rights if normal persons were involved.
First Nat'! Bank 11, 359 N.E.2d at 1269 (citation omitted) (quoting Asbury Hosp. v. Cass
County, 326 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1945), and Northwest Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S.
243, 255 (1906)). The court further noted that "as an incident of such protection, corporations
possess certain rights of speech and expression under the First Amendment." Id. at 1270. The
court then held:
[O]nly when a general political issue materially affects a corporation's business,
property or assets may that corporation claim First Amendment protection for
its speech or other activities entitling it to communicate its position on that issue
to the general public. This limitation is identical to the legislative command in
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:317
court focused on the relationship between the First Amendment and
the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to corporations.7 The Attor-
ney General argued that since a corporation could not claim protec-
tion of liberty interests under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the corporation could not
claim any aspect of a right to free speech based solely upon its liberty
interest.7'
The argument further suggested that incorporation of the First
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment narrowed the scope
of any First Amendment protection for corporations to speech that
related to the corporation's business or assets or other property inter-
ests. Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected
this argument as both unsupported and non-persuasive, the court
ruled, without supporting authority, that corporations did not have
"the same First Amendment rights to free speech as those of a natural
person, [although] ... a corporation's property and business interest
[were] entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. "72 Thus,
speech connected with matters "materially affecting" the business of
the corporation would be constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court, however, was critical of this line of analy-
sis. 73  It found the doctrine "untenable under [its] decisions. ' 74 The
court cited several of its precedents for the proposition that First
the first sentence of [the statute]. Put in another way, the Legislature has clearly
identified in the challenged statute the parameters of corporate free speech.
Id. (emphasis added). With this language, the Massachusetts court enunciated what became
known as the "materially affecting" theory.
70. First Nat'l Bank II, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
71. Id. at 1270 n.12 (noting that same issue was raised in challenge to earlier version of
statute and was rejected in First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney General (First Nat'l Bank 1). 290
N.E.2d 526, 535 (1972).
72. Id. at 1270 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
73. The Supreme Court characterized this analysis in the following manner:
The court below found confirmation of the legislature's definition of the scope of
a corporation's First Amendment rights in the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Noting that the First Amendment is applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth, and seizing upon the observation that corporations
"cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees," . . . the court concluded that a corporation's First Amendment
rights must derive from its property rights under the Fourteenth.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535). Interestingly, it seems that this First
Amendment theory dictates a fictional entity conception. The corporation's participation in
political issues is totally subordinate to the state's power to regulate. Had the Court accepted
it, and thereby categorically denied First Amendment protection to corporate political speech
not related to corporate assets or business, there would be no need for an analysis of the
corporate conception employed by the Court. First Amendment analysis would have man-
dated a particular corporate conception and obviated any consideration of other approaches.
74. Id. at 779.
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Amendment speech was "within the liberty safeguarded by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state
action."75 The Court then noted that it had "not identified a separate
source for the right when it has been asserted by corporations."76
The State buttressed its argument with references to several
Supreme Court precedents. It claimed that the cases outlined the
contours of the application of First Amendment doctrine to corpora-
tions in two respects: through those decisions that established consti-
tutional protection for communications businesses, and through
similar decisions that protected commercial speech.17  The State
sought to explain how its understanding of First Amendment doctrine
could support the results in these cases while denying First Amend-
ment protection* to corporations generally.78 It argued that the
"materially affecting" theory explained both the legitimate protection
of communications businesses, some of which may choose the corpo-
rate form, and limitations on corporate political speech.7 a
In the State's view, the expression of media corporations, such as
newspapers and television and radio stations, would "materially
affect" their business and, therefore be protected by the First Amend-
ment from burdens imposed by state government. The State argued
75. Id. (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1952)). The Court
supported its position with references to NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
460 (1958); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 368 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
76. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780. The Court noted that in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 244 (1936), it found that the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment was
that of "NATURAL not of artificial persons," and went on to point out that such reasoning
would logically lead to the conclusion that "the protection afforded speech by corporations...
would differ depending on whether the source of the alleged abridgment was a State or the
Federal Government." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780 n.16. The Court further pointed out that
although such a theory had been accepted by certain members, notably (then) Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Jackson, and Justice Harlan, the view had never been accepted by a
majority of the Court. Id. This position, which would allow the states but not the federal
government to regulate corporate speech, was characterized by the majority as "semantic
reasoning" that would logically lead to a previously unendorsed conclusion. Id. This
approach, however, seems compatible with a view of the corporation that focuses on the state's
relationship with the corporation as its creator. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
77. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781-83.
78. Id. at 781.
79. Id. Chief Justice Burger joined in the opinion and judgment of the majority, but he
wrote separately to address his concern that acceptance of the State's position might endanger
the rights of communications businesses that might choose to adopt the corporate form. In his
concurring opinion, he explicated his theory of the Free Press Clause, which he found to be an
integral aspect of the First Amendment. Given this perspective, it would be difficult to
conceive of an effective limitation upon corporate speech, which might also be construed as
guaranteed by the Free Press Clause. Id. at 795-802. While it seems possible to distinguish
between the press and non-press related activities of a corporation, Justice Burger's treatment
of the Press Clause effectively obviates the question of corporate theory posed by this Article.
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that this theory was implicit in prior Supreme Court doctrine. The
Court disagreed, holding that the "materially affecting" theory "was
not the governing rationale" in any of its cases.80
The Court similarly rejected the claim that the "materially affect-
ing" theory undergirded its decisions to protect commercial speech.
Noting that the theory supporting commercial speech caselaw was
related more to the "free flow of commercial information" for the
benefit of "members of the public""' than to the business interests of
the commercial speaker, the Court suggested that the cases reflect a
deeper meaning of First Amendment protection, one which goes
beyond merely the right to self-expression."2 The Court then con-
cluded, in language reflecting the majority's implicit theory of the
corporation:
We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or
in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that
otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment
loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation that
cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its
business or property. The "materially affecting" requirement is
not an identification of the boundaries of corporate speech etched
by the Constitution itself. Rather, it amounts to an impermissible
legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests
that spokesmen may represent in public debate over controversial
issues and a requirement that the speaker have a sufficiently great
interest in the subject to justify communication.83
This language indicates that the majority conceives of the corpo-
ration as a discernable entity having rights in contemplation of law. 4
When the corporation is the "speaker"-meaning that both the
message and the funding are generated by and from the corporate
structure-the state cannot impose a limitation based on the "identity
of the interests that it may represent."8 5 The Court's distinction
between the legislature's treatment of corporations and the limitation
on the prerogatives of stockholders illustrates its view that corpora-
tions are entities capable of being placed on equal footing with indi-
viduals as part of the polity. Although this approach clearly is
distinct from an aggregate theory, the Court fails to indicate whether
a natural entity or fictional entity paradigm undergirds its approach.
80. Id. at 781.
81. Id. at 783.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
84. The Court's entity characterization and its recognition of the corporation as somewhat
independent of the state suggests its underlying theory is the natural entity paradigm. See id.
85. Id.
[Vol. 46:317
CORPORATE LEGAL THEORY
After concluding that the First Amendment protects corporate
speech, however, the Court examined whether the State had shown a
compelling interest justifying the regulation. In its examination of
these interests, the Court once again exposed its underlying concep-
tion of the corporation as an entity. Moreover, the Court's treatment
of the issue revealed one problem with inexplicit reliance on a particu-
lar theory-the potential for confusion.
The State asserted two interests: (1) the retention of citizen con-
fidence in government by sustaining the active role of individual citi-
zens in the electoral process; 6 and (2) the protection of the rights of
shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by the corpora-
tion.8 7 While the majority did not reject the importance of these
interests, it found them to be either unaffected or not substantially
served by the statutory prohibition. 8
The Court acknowledged the distinction between partisan candi-
date elections and public referenda, as well as the implications of the
distinction for First Amendment purposes.8 9 It reasoned that how-
ever weighty First Amendment interests may be in the context of par-
tisan candidate elections, they either were not implicated in the
referendum context or were not served by the Massachusetts
86. Id. at 787.
87. Id. The Court recognized the state interest in the integrity of government and
retaining the confidence of the people in a democratic process by preventing the sheer wealth
and power of corporations to drown out the views of the populous. Here, however, the State's
failure to produce legislative evidence that this dilution of views was imminent led the Court to
find no showing that "the relative voice of corporations [had] been overwhelming in
influencing referenda in Massachusetts or that there [had] been any threat to the confidence of
the citizenry in government." Id. at 789-90 (footnote omitted).
More importantly, the Court also asserted that arguments which might apply to
candidate elections were inherently unpersuasive when applied to referenda and were not
supported by precedent. Id. at 790. For cases discussing corruption in candidate elections and
public referenda, see United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) (labor organization
indicted for using union dues to sponsor commercial television broadcasts designed to
influence electorate); United States v. COI, 335 U.S. 106 (1948) (labor organization indicted
for issuing publication in which its president promoted a particular candidate); see also
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 (noting that the risk of corruption generally perceived in cases
involving candidate elections simply was "not present in a popular vote on a public issue").
88. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 787-88. The Court stated that "[p]reserving the integrity of the
electoral process, preventing corruption, and 'sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the
individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government' are interests of the
highest importance." Id. at 788-89 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
89. The Court relied upon the election-referenda dichotomy to distinguish the doctrinal
implications of Austin from those of Bellotti. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110
S. Ct. 1391, 1397 (1990). The majority opinions indicate that the State in Bellotti failed to
support the allegations regarding the corrupting influence of corporate wealth in a referendum,
but that in Austin, involving candidate elections, the State did not need to make such a
showing. The Court has failed to explain the reasons for its burden allocations. The
persuasive power of corporate resources is equally effective in either situation.
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prohibition.10
In addressing the concern that corporate advertising might affect
referendum outcomes, the Court provided another indication of its
underlying theory of the corporation in society. Specifically, the
Court opined: "To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the
outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that
advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress
it: The Constitution protects expression which is eloquent no less
than that which is unconvincing.' "' The Court then quoted from
Buckley v. Valeo92 that "'the concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.' "9
The Court's adoption by reference of the language "elements of our
society" and "voice of others," as well as the conscious rhetorical sug-
gestion that the dominance of the corporate perspective could only
result from its eloquence, again makes clear that the Bellotti majority
viewed corporations as additional entities in our society, or merely
other parts of the polity.94 Indeed, the Court suggests that corpora-
tions have rights as members in our society, as opposed to having
rights, as is the case with associations, appropriately derived from a
connection with individuals. This analysis further suggests that the
majority's conception of corporations fits within an entity-based
paradigm.95
The Court rejected the second arguably legitimate governmental
90. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90.
91. Id. at 790 (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959)).
Some public-choice theorists, examining the process of legislative decisionmaking, posit that
convincing political speech may actually have little influence on legislative outcomes. Under
the public choice model, the legislature is a market where influential pressure groups attempt
to codify their selfish interests. " ' [L]egislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid
rival seekers of favorable legislation.'" Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 878-79 (1987) (quoting William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18
J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975)). In Bellotti, the Court appears to adopt the policy that free
speech should be protected because it encourages the free flow of information essential to
rational decisionmaking by the electorate. The underlying assumption is that the values of the
governing body will be determined by an electorate that is free from state interference.
Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255. Public
choice theory undermines this assumption by characterizing the legislature as a market
dominated by interest groups.
92. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
93. Belloti, 435 U.S. at 790-91 (emphasis added) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 148-49).
94. Id.
95. Dan-Cohen argues that because associations do not have the autonomy rights of
individuals, their right to free speech must derive from the autonomy interests of the public to
hear the communication. Dan-Cohen interprets Bellotti to grant First Amendment protection
on this basis. MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 104 (1986).
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interest asserted by the State-the concern for minority shareholders
whose resources might be used in support of views with which they
disagree.96 The Court concluded that the statute was too narrowly
drafted to serve such a purpose, and, in this respect, found the statute
both underinclusive and overinclusive. 97 The Court's treatment of the
arguments addressing the tailoring of the statute to this interest illus-
trates the confusion that may flow from a failure to explicitly deline-
ate one's conceptual foundations. Until this point in the opinion, the
Court had written of corporations as entities that have status
independent of their connection with shareholders and critically dis-
tinguishable from mere associations of individuals. In addressing the
various arguments regarding the tailoring of the statute, the Court
strayed from this course and began to treat corporations as analogous
to associations.
The Court found the statute inexcusably underinclusive for its
failure to include in the prohibition: (1) corporate legislative lobby-
ing; (2) corporate speech relating to public issues prior to their
becoming the subject of any referendum; or (3) other entities or
organized groups.9s The Court found that the absence of these types
of corporate speech and the speech of non-corporate groups "under-
mine[d] the plausibility of the State's purported concern for the per-
sons who happen to be shareholders in the banks and corporations
covered." 99 The Court also viewed the statute as overinclusive
because it precluded corporate expression even when there was share-
holder unanimity. 0
These underinclusiveness arguments seem designed to place the
regulation of corporate speech on a "slippery slope" which ultimately
would allow the silencing of any group of individuals. The over-
breadth argument is highly speculative because the likelihood of una-
nimity in a large corporation is roughly as probable as unanimity in a
senatorial election. 01 Additionally, it misperceives corporate law
96. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792-93.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 793.
99. Id. at 782 ("The fact that a particular kind of ballot question has been singled out for
special treatment undermines the likelihood of a genuine state interest in protecting
shareholders. It suggests instead that the legislature may have been concerned with silencing
corporations on a particular subject.").
100. Id. at 794.
101. According to statistics from the last general Senate elections before 1990, the winning
candidates received 1,573,709 votes on average out of 2,920,340 votes cast. MICHAEL BARONE
& GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1988). The statistics are drawn
from individual election results reported. On December 31, 1989, the record date for the 1990
Board election, General Motors Corporation had 1,933,000 shareholders entitled to vote.
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doctrine. 0 2
These problems aside, however, the Court's analysis reveals an
apparently unconscious shift from an entity oriented corporate para-
digm to an aggregate paradigm. The shift here undermines the
cogency of the opinion because it suggests that fundamental premises
used in one portion of the opinion were unconsciously and without
explanation modified in another, and raises the question whether this
opinion represents reasoning or mere justification. This critique goes
beyond the legal realist premise that opinions merely justify judicial
attempts to achieve certain policy objectives. There would be no basis
for concern if the meandering between various corporate theories was
purposefully designed to achieve particular policy objectives. While
one might be concerned about the basis upon which the court moved
between those theories, such changes might be appropriate for the ful-
fillment of policy objectives. The concern for justification raised here
is that the Court inadvertently may be re-conceptualizing the corpora-
tion in response to particular arguments. This may result in a failure
to objectively consider whether an appropriate corporate legal theory
may provide a firm foundation for the consistent resolution of all the
issues in a case. 10 3
The concern for shareholders' rights in this respect suggests that
the majority has altered its conception of the corporation, from the
previously expressed entity conception to a view of the corporation is
as an aggregation of its shareholders." Of course, the opinion's
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT (1989). Thus, individual senatorial
elections are comparable to the election of a board of directors.
102. Since corporations are managed by their board of directors, pursuant to state statutes,
the corporation's position on non-business related matters would not be within the province of
the shareholders. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE. § 300 (West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1986); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT § 8.01 (1984). Thus, unanimity of shareholders on the particular position would
merely result in a unanimous resolution favoring that particular perspective. It would only be
translated into corporate action in the event that the matter was of sufficient significance to
motivate the threat of or actual ouster of the board and the selection of a new board with views
similar to those of the shareholders.
Further, assuming that the public corporation is subject to the proxy regulations of the
federal securities laws, corporate management could exclude from its proxy materials the
proposal to change the corporation's position on the issue. Such a stockholder proposal would
be excludable under Rule 14a on at least two bases: under (c)(5) as not significantly related to
the issuer's business; or under (c)(6) as beyond the issuer's power to implement. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (1990). In Bellotti, the matter of individual tax rates would clearly have been open
to exclusion under either of these provisions.
103. For discussion of the rationales to be considered in selecting or changing one's concept
of the corporation, see infra parts III and IV.
104. This rationale was first explicitly put forth in Justice Field's opinion in Minneapolis &
St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889). O'Kelley has termed this construct the "Field
rationale," which presumes that the rights of a business corporation are "coextensive with the
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flawed reasoning may also be due to oversight rather than the product
of serious consideration. One benefit of coherently applying the entity
oriented theory initially adopted-at least in the context of corporate
involvement in political discourse-would be that the Court simply
could have dispensed with the concern for minority shareholders.
Under an entity conception, the corporate body is separate and dis-
tinct from that of its shareholders. Any shareholder potentially dis-
turbed by statements of the corporation could either accept the
difference of opinion or sell the shares.
This minor deviation from an otherwise solid entity-oriented
analysis must be viewed as exactly that, a deviation from the main
thesis of the opinion. Further, the lack of any explicit discussion of
the conception of the corporation implemented in the opinion pro-
motes such deviations."-' In this instance, the uncertainty of the
majority's corporate theory selection requires analysis to determine
the paradigm the Court envisions as it addresses the issues
presented."°c The language, except for the minor exceptions noted
rights that its shareholders would enjoy if they had chosen to conduct their business in an
unincorporated form." O'Kelley, supra note 6, at 1355-56. The majority's concern in Bellotti
that management may use corporate resources to further causes with which some shareholders
disagree may indicate that the Court supports Field's rationale for the protection of corporate
speech.
105. For a discussion of the need for cogency in the justices' selection of the appropriate
corporate legal theory, see infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
106. Some suggest that Justice Powell was able to avoid any expression of his theory of the
corporation. Phillip Blumberg writes:
[Justice Powell] did not find it necessary to articulate his own theory of the
nature of the corporation in order to dispose of the case. Instead, he relied on the
fundamental value of "the right of public discussion" from the societal point of
view and he held that the corporation, as well as its officers or directors, could
not be constitutionally barred from discussion of public issues.
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 283, 316-18 (1990); see also Hager, supra note 36, at 579-82, 644 ("If the Bellotti
dissents resurrected the fiction paradigm ironically as pro-regulatory, it might be expected that
the majority would revive the real entity theory to buttress its anti-regulatory theory of corpo-
rate free expression 'rights.' In fact, however, the majority avoided defending any theory of
corporate personhood."). I reject this conclusion and submit that the application of law, par-
ticularly the First Amendment, to the corporation requires that one take a position on the
issue of corporate legal theory. Although Hager reaches the conclusion that the majority effec-
tively avoided any characterization of the corporate persona in Bellotti, he uses an analytical
approach similar to mine in concluding that the Court's subsequent opinion in Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), did assume a natural entity concep-
tion of the corporation. Hager notes that
the Court [in Consolidated Edison] wrote, 'Where a government restricts the
speech of a private person, the state action may be sustained only if the govern-
ment can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a com-
pelling state interest.' The context makes clear that the Court meant to include
the regulated utility within the category of 'private person' so analyzed. This
first amendment treatment of a corporation enjoying a state-sponsored monopoly
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above, suggests that the Court was not willing to treat the corporation
as solely an aggregate of its constituencies. Similarly, the majority did
not adopt a fictional entity conception wherein the state's dominance
would have unquestionably justified the statutory restriction. 0 7
Given the majority's substantial adoption of an entity orientation and
its respect for the interests of shareholders vis-a-vis the authority of
the state, it seems that the majority's vision of corporateness could
best be described as favoring a natural entity conception.
An examination of Justice White's dissenting opinion reveals a
similar contradiction in his conception of the corporation, although
he generally seems to adopt a fictional entity conception. In his opin-
ion, Justice White first narrowed the question presented to the Court.
He took the position that the plaintiff's failure to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the irrebuttable statutory presumption, which deemed
referenda on individual taxation not to affect corporate business,
removed the issue of business-related communication from considera-
tion by the Court. Therefore, in his view the Court was presented
with the question of "whether a State may prevent corporate manage-
ment from using the corporate treasury to propagate views [which, in
fact, have] no connection with the corporate business.' 0 8
Next, Justice White reasoned that the state's regulatory interests
derived from a concern for First Amendment values. °9 Conse-
quently, for Justice White, the question raised by Bellotti was how to
balance appropriately the opposing First Amendment interests.' "° In
his view, the majority erred because it supplanted the legislature's
judgment regarding the appropriate balance, not merely because it
applied the First Amendment to corporate speech. According to Jus-
tice White, the error was amplified because legislators have greater
expertise than the Court in the political arena."'
Justice White made it clear that the nature and extent of First
Amendment protections afforded to corporate speech were not coter-
minous with those afforded to individual speech." 2 He indicated that,
as a private person' would be laughable were it not so ominous.... The Court's
rhetoric may indicate an emerging tendency to use corporate [natural] entity
imagery in defense of free expression rights for capital.
Hager, supra note 36, at 645.
107. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text for discussion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's treatment of this case under fictional entity theory.
108. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 803.
109. Id. at 804.
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id. ("First Amendment values that corporate expression furthers and the threat to the
functioning of a free society it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with
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among the interests supported by the First Amendment, those values
related to self-actualization" 13 were not furthered by corporate
speech." 4 While accepting the principle that speech, irrespective of
its source, furthers the First Amendment interest in promoting the
exchange of ideas, Justice White questioned whether the public's
interest in receiving corporate communication was of the "same
dimension" as its interest in receiving other forms of expression." 5
This proposition was supported by his position that corporate action,
in this regard, had only an attenuated connection with individual self-
expression. He concluded that "[i]deas which are not a product of
individual choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection." 116
Justice White also noted that restrictions upon corporate speech con-
cerning political issues "impingen much less severely upon the availa-
bility of ideas to the general public than do restrictions upon
individual speech," ' 1 7 and that "[e]ven the complete curtailment of
corporate communications concerning political or ideological ques-
tions not integral to day-to-day business functions would leave indi-
viduals, including corporate shareholders, employees, and customers,
communications emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions which individual
expression is not.").
113. Id. at 804-05 (listing the values of "self-expression, self-realization, and self-
fulfillment").
114. Id. Justice White then noted, "It is clear that the communications of profitmaking
corporations are not 'an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration and of
the affirmation of self.'" Id. at 805 (quoting THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966)). On this basis, Justice White distinguished
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), which involved non-profit membership corporations
"formed for the express purpose of advancing certain ideological causes." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
805. Apparently, Justice White would be willing to conceive of representational types of
corporate entities, such as the NAACP, as primarily aggregates for purposes of First
Amendment analysis. Therefore, conversely, he apparently maintains an entity conception of
general purpose for-profit corporations. Cf FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 252-53 & n.6 (1986) (finding that corporation dedicated to advancing pro-life
movement was subject to limits that Federal Election Campaign Act placed on corporate
contributions); see also infra notes 147-63 and accompanying text (discussing justifications in
Austin for limiting corporate speech and not speech by other associations).
115. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 807 (finding "the right of the general public to receive
communications financed by means of corporate expenditures is of the same dimension as that
to hear other forms of expression") (emphasis added). While on its face, this remark seems
only to suggest that the financing is derived from the corporate entity, it intimates that the
message, not merely its financing, may be different from a synthesis of the shareholders' actual
positions.
116. Id. The assertion that corporate expressions are "not a product of individual choice"
makes it clear that Justice White views corporate expression as more than merely derivative of
shareholder positions. This view sharply contrasts with the aggregate conception expressed
explicitly by Justice Scalia in Austin. See 110 S. Ct. at 1411.
117. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 807.
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free to communicate their thoughts."' 8
In bolstering this position that the governmental interest in regu-
lating corporate political communications differs from those gov-
erning the regulation of individual speech, Justice White explicitly
described his fundamental theory of the corporation.
Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of
furthering certain economic goals. In order to facilitate the
achievement of such ends, special rules relating to such matters as
limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution,
and taxation of assets are normally applied to them. States have
provided corporations with such attributes in order to increase
their economic viability and thus strengthen the economy gener-
ally. It has long been recognized, however, that the special status
of corporations has placed them in a position to control vast
amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate
not only the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the
electoral process .... The State need not permit its own creation to
consume it." 9
This demonstrates an acceptance of a fictional entity theory of the
corporation. The state's dominance over the corporate form clearly is
basic to his conception. Although subsequent segments of the dissent-
ing opinion suggest different views of the corporation, the fictional
entity theory seems to be the most explicit theoretical explanation.120
118. Id. Justice White notes that certain communications, typically associated with the
corporation's business, if curtailed could "impinge[] seriously upon the right to receive
information," but that nothing in the statute contemplates curtailment of communication
associated with the corporation's business. Id. at 807-08. Further, Justice White states that
nothing in the statute prohibits the formulation of corporate views on non-business matters
that might be publicized at the expense of individuals associated with the corporation. Id. at
808-09.
119. Id. at 809. Justice White states that "[c]orporations... are created by the State as a
means of furthering the public welfare. One of their functions is to determine, by their success
in obtaining funds, the uses to which society's resources are to be put." Id. at 818-19.
120. One example of Justice White's deviation from fictional entity theory surfaced when he
supported the First Amendment interest in preventing minority shareholders from financially
supporting positions with which they disagree and that are ancillary to the business of the
corporation. Id. at 812-22. Justice White argued that statutes that affect corporate political
participation outside the scope of the business of the corporation are consistent with the First
Amendment and protect freedoms that the Court found to be guaranteed under the First
Amendment in a series of other circumstances. He pointed to three cases to demonstrate his
point: Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943) (striking down state statute
compelling both saluting flag and recitation of pledge of allegiance in public school, on theory
that First Amendment prohibits public authorities from requiring individuals to express
support for or disagreement with causes with which they disagree or concerning which they
prefer to remain silent); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 770 (1961), and Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (sustaining challenges by union members to the
promotion of political views with which they disagreed). White's analysis suggests that he
thinks of the corporation as an aggregation rather than an entity.
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Justice White's failure to hold true to his expressed fundamental
corporate theory explains his analogies to labor unions, which he
might simply have rejected as inapplicable. 2' Instead of positing that
the remedies applied in the union context would be unworkable in the
corporate context, the theory of the firm described previously by Jus-
tice White would have provided an adequate basis for simply
acknowledging the fundamental conceptual difference between labor
unions and corporations.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, expressed the most
clearly focused conception of the corporation. He views the corpora-
tion as a fictional entity, quoting the language of Chief Justice Mar-
shall from Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward:22
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of
law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of creation
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very exist-
ence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the
object for which it was created.' 23
Because Justice Rehnquist consistently viewed the corporation as
a fictional entity dominated by the state of its creation, 24 he con-
121. Given the fictional entity view of the corporation, the analogy to labor unions seems
inappropriate. The First Amendment values protected, where the participants are members of
a group created to represent their interests but whose expressions no longer conform to their
beliefs, only have relevance in the corporate context under an aggregate conception. The
nature of the minority shareholder's interests under a fictional entity conception of the
corporation is simply not comparable to the nature of a union member's interest in a union
shop. The shareholder's interests may be more analogous to the interests of a lending
institution than to a union member. At least under the fictional entity theory, the corporate
entities involved in Bellotti had not been created by its incorporators, authorized by their
respective states of incorporation, or subscribed to by subsequent equity purchasers as
representational bodies. Instead, they were created as separate and distinct economic entities.
On the contrary, unions, which also serve economic objectives, are created precisely to
represent the interests of employees in their joint contractual relations with management,
which acts on behalf of the employer.
Another distinction between both corporations and labor unions, at least from the
perspective of the fictional entity corporate theorist, is the role of voting. Voting in unions is
performed on a one person, one vote basis. With corporations, although the term corporate
democracy is used, voting is generally performed on the basis of the number of shares held,
and in some cases, share ownership may not even entitle the shareholder to vote at all in
corporate elections.
122. 14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
123. Id. at 636, quoted in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This famous
quotation has been recognized as one of the quintessential statements of the fictional entity
theory of the corporation. See Bratton, supra note 8, at 1484 & n.60; see also Hager, supra note
36, at 642-43 (characterizing both dissents in Bellotti as employing the fictional entity
paradigm).
124. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 823-24 & n.2 ("The appellants herein either were created by the
Commonwealth or were admitted into the Commonwealth only for the limited purposes
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cluded that the Court's critical inquiry was "to determine which con-
stitutional protections [were] 'incidental to [the corporation's] very
existence.' ",125 Thus, Justice Rehnquist found it entirely reasonable
that the state might be concerned about the impact that this economic
entity would have in the political arena.1 26 Additionally, he was satis-
fied that the "materially affecting" theory provided sufficient protec-
tion to corporations. 127  Clearly, Justice Rehnquist views the
corporation as a fictional entity with a set of constitutional rights that
are distinct from those available to natural persons.
In Bellotti, therefore, it seems that two of the three paradigms of
the corporation are intentionally, though not always consistently,
applied. The majority opinion expresses its view least explicitly and
attempts to sublimate the question of corporate theory in favor of
focusing on the First Amendment question. Implicit in the majority's
language, however, is a strong natural entity conception. The dissent-
ing opinions of both Justices White and Rehnquist rely upon and are
driven by fictional entity conceptions. The outcome in Bellotti, in
which five justices joined in an opinion implicitly founded upon a nat-
ural entity conception and four justices joined in opinions driven by
fictional entity conceptions, suggests a significant cleavage on this fun-
damental issue. The significance of the selection of a particular para-
digm is further supported by the Court's recent opinion in Austin.
With the addition of Justice Scalia to the Court, however, the third
paradigm, nexus of contracts, is consciously introduced.
128
2. AUSTIN V. MICHIGAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
In Austin, the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan statute that
described in their charters and regulated by state law."). Later Rehnquist states "[tihere can
be little doubt that when a State creates a corporation with the power to acquire and utilize
property, it necessarily and implicitly guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of
that property absent due process of law." Id. at 824.
125. Id. at 824 (quoting Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636).
126. Id. at 826 ("It might reasonably be concluded that those properties [of the
corporation], so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political
sphere.").
127. Id. at 827-28. The Court noted:
[The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court] reasoned that this Court's decisions
entitling the property of a corporation to constitutional protection should he
construed as recognizing the liberty of a corporation to express itself on political
matters concerning that property. Thus, the Court construed the statute in
question not to forbid political expression by a corporation "when a general
political issue materially affects a corporation's business, property or assets."
Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank II, 359 N.E.2d at 1270).
128. The contractarian perspective that drives Justice Scalia's analysis reflects the
economist's vision one might anticipate from his University of Chicago credentials.
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effectively precluded "corporations from making contributions and
independent expenditures in connection with state candidate elec-
tions." '29 The Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, a non-profit
membership corporation,1a0 brought an injunctive action challenging
the constitutionality of the state regulation under the First
Amendment. '3'
The district court denied the injunction. 3 2 It found that the stat-
ute infringed on the Chamber's speech and did not qualify as a rea-
sonable "time, place, and manner regulationfl . . . 'applicable . . .
irrespective of content.' "a133 The court concluded, however, that the
statute was sufficiently narrow to protect the state's compelling inter-
est in preventing the appearance of corruption in the electoral pro-
cess. 3 4  Interestingly, although the district court noted that such a
regulation of individual speech would violate the First Amendment, it
129. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1395 (1990) (citing
§ 54(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.254(1) (1979)).
This statute, as noted by the Court, was modeled after the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1985), and did allow expenditures by the corporation from a segregated
account that was to have been funded by contributions from various constituencies of the
corporation.
130. The Chamber had some 8,000 members, nearly 6,000 of which were for-profit
corporations. It was funded solely by the membership, primarily from its members'
contributions of annual dues. Interestingly, the Chamber's by-laws stated its goals were
to promote economic conditions favorable to private enterprise; to analyze,
compile, and disseminate information about laws of interest to the business
community on such matters; to train and educate its members; to foster ethical
business practices; to collect data on and investigate matters of social, civic, and
economic importance to the State; to receive contributions and to make
expenditures for political purposes; and to perform any other lawful political
activity; and to coordinate activities with other similar organizations.
Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1395-96 (emphasis added).
131. The Chamber had, in fact, established a separately funded account for political
purposes, but wanted to used funds from its general treasury to place certain local newspaper
advertisements in support of a particular candidate for the Michigan House of
Representatives. Id. at 1396.
132. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397, 401-04 (W.D.
Mich. 1986), rev'd, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
133. Id. at 402 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980)).
134. Id. The state proposed to the court that three concerns were compelling: (1) "the
integrity of the electoral process by preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption
created by large, corporate independent expenditures on behalf of political candidates";
(2) "the interest of some shareholders by preventing the use of corporate funds to elect
political candidates whom those shareholders may oppose"; and (3) the interest in ensuring
"that the electorate is fully informed of the sources of campaign finances." Id. The district
court ultimately relied upon the first interest solely, and noted that the Supreme Court had
thus far identified only this interest as sufficiently compelling to justify restricting speech. Id.
at 402 & n.7 (citing FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480
(1985)).
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concluded that this statute did not precisely because the regulation
restricted only corporate expression. 35
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court. 36 The court based its reversal upon
the intervening Supreme Court decision in FEC v. Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 37 which held that non-profit membership
corporations had the same First Amendment protection as individu-
als. 3  The court did not dispute the district court's reasoning as it
may have related to general purpose corporations. Instead, it
reversed because it found the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce
similar to Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., the corporation
involved in MCFL.
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling, finding
that the statute's restrictions burdened the exercise of political
speech.'39 It also found that "[tjhe mere fact that the Chamber is a
corporation [did] not remove its speech from the ambit of the First
Amendment."'" The Court, however, went on to hold that although
the state had burdened corporate speech, it had "articulated a suffi-
135. Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 403-04. The district court's distinction between what would be
permissible regulation of individual speech and permissible regulation of corporate expression
was based upon three premises: (1) that the benefits conferred by the government upon
corporations justified enhanced regulation; (2) that the judiciary should defer to legislative
determinations of the need for prophylactic measures; and (3) that, given the historical
restriction (since 1913) of such expression, there was no need for any legislative finding on the
threat of corruption. Id. at 404.
136. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1988) rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
137. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
138. Id. at 263-64.
139. Id. at 263. The Court reasoned that "the use of funds to support a political candidate
is 'speech'" and that "independent [campaign] expenditures constitute [political] expression
'at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment.' " Id. at 251 (relying upon
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968))).
Following its ruling in MCFL, 479 U.S. at 252, 266, the Court found that the required use of
segregated funds, while not stifling corporate speech, did burden expressive activity to the
extent that a compelling state interest would be necessary to justify such regulation in the face
of the First Amendment challenge.
140. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396 (citing First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 777 (1978)). The Bellotti majority clearly articulated the point that speech otherwise
protected by the First Amendment would not be denied such protection merely because the
speaker was a corporation. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775-86. However, the Court expressly left
unanswered the extent to which corporate speech would be protected. The majority stated,
"[W]e need not survey the outer boundaries of the [First] Amendment's protection of
corporate speech, or address the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure
of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment." Id. at 777. Further, the Court
found no "occasion to consider in this case whether, under different circumstances, a
justification for a restriction on speech that would be inadequate as applied to individuals
might suffice to sustain the same restriction as applied to corporations, unions, or like entities."
Id. at 777 n.13.
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ciently compelling rationale to support its restriction." '' This ration-
ale was based on Michigan's efforts to regulate the "corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumu-
lated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas." 14
2
The Court then examined whether the regulation was "suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored to achieve its goal."' 43 The majority found
that the state regulation was, in fact, "precisely targeted to eliminate
the distortion caused by corporate spending."'" The majority also
found that the statutory limitation that allowed the spending of segre-
gated funds specifically solicited for political purposes was a viable
avenue for corporate expression. If such funds were used, the Court
reasoned, corporate expression would more accurately reflect contrib-
utors' support for the expression. 45
The majority rejected arguments regarding the substantially
overinclusive effect of the state regulation. As a practical matter, the
regulation clearly affected small closely held corporations, whose
spending would probably correlate strongly with the vision of their
stockholders, as well as the statute's target, large publicly held corpo-
rations. Despite this, the majority rejected the overinclusiveness
attack because of the potential for both sorts of entities ultimately to
141. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
142. Id. at 1397 (emphasis added). The Court went on to respond to assertions in the
dissenting opinions of Justices Kennedy and Scalia that the effect of the decision was to
authorize attempts "to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections." See id. at 1421
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This response suggested that the
effect of justifying the regulation was to "ensured that expenditures reflect actual public
support for the political ideas espoused by corporations." Id. at 1398. The Court stated:
We emphasize that the mere fact that corporations may accumulate large
amounts of wealth is not the justification for § 54; rather, the unique state-
conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries
warrants the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth can unfairly
influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures
just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions.
Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The majority asserts that both Justices Kennedy and Scalia, when they argued that
the regulation prohibited corporate speech, assumed that the expenditure of segregated funds
did not provide a viable opportunity for corporate expression. See id. at 1418, 1419, 1422
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 1409 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In fact, these dissenting justices
recognized the patent opportunity for the corporation to set up what, in effect, would be a
captive political action committee ("PAC"). However, they proposed interpreting the
expenditures of such an entity not to be expenditures by the corporation as a corporation but
expenditures of the corporation's captive PAC. Id. at 1423.
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distort the political process. 146
After establishing this basic First Amendment rationale, the
Court addressed three specific contentions of the Michigan Chamber
of Commerce. The first, based upon the Court's ruling in MCFL, was
that even if the statute were constitutional in its regulation of corpo-
rate speech generally, it was not constitutional to regulate non-profit,
membership corporations. 147 The Sixth Circuit had accepted this dis-
tinction in its ruling. 148 The contention stemmed from characteristics
used by the Supreme Court in MCFL to distinguish the treatment of
certain non-profit, membership corporations from that of the typical
for-profit corporation.
MCFL involved an organization incorporated as a non-profit,
membership corporation for the express purpose of engaging in the
Massachusetts debate over reproductive choice.'49 The Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a provision of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act ("FECA")II° that, like the Michigan statute involved in
Austin, required corporations to establish segregated funds in order to
make any expenditures in connection with a federal election. The
FECA already had survived a facial attack in Buckley; the question in
MCFL was whether such a provision could be applied to a non-profit,
non-stock, or membership corporation. The Court, in MCFL, seized
upon three aspects of non-profit corporations that distinguish them
from typical for-profit corporations.
The first characteristic was that the corporation in MCFL was
not an ordinary business corporation because it was formed for the
express purpose of "promoting political ideas, and [could not] engage
in business activities."'' The Court explained that this "narrow
political focus 'ensure[d] that [its] political resources reflect[ed] polit-
146. Id. at 1398. This reasoning was supported by FEC v. National Right to Work Comm.,
459 U.S. 197 (1982), where the Court accepted the congressional judgment "that it is the
potential for such influence that demands regulation." Id. at 209-10. In National Right to
Work, the Court held that § 441b restricted both corporations and labor unions, covering a
range of sizes and financial resources. Because the statute was intended to stem the potential
to improperly influence the political process, the Court accepted Congress' judgment that these
divergently situated entities should be treated similarly. Id.
147. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986)
(holding that non-profit organization which had features more akin to "voluntary . . .
associations than business firms... should not have to bear burdens on independent spending
solely because of [its] incorporated status").
148. Michigan Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 856 F.2d 783, 788-90 (6th Cir. 1988)
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
149. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241-42.
150. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1985),
151. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264.
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ical support.' "152 Since the Chamber had a broader purpose which
was not strictly political in nature, the Court found that it was distin-
guishable from MCFL.153
In MCFL, the Supreme Court was also swayed by the fact that
the corporation did not have "shareholders or other persons affiliated
so as to have a -claim on [the] assets or earnings" of the organiza-
tion. 4 This characteristic provided the second basis for the Court's
distinction between the non-profit, membership corporation in MCFL
and typical for-profit corporations. Shareholders made a difference
because the nature of their relationship with the corporate entity cre-
ated barriers to their disassociation from the organization in the event
of disagreement. As a result of the relatively low barriers to disassoci-
ation presented by the corporation in MCFL, the Court presumed
that there would be a closer correlation between the political views of
members and the entity itself. After all, when such barriers are low,
mere disagreement, particularly with expressions of an organization
created to project a particular view, might provide a sufficient basis
for an individual member to withdraw.
The Court found that the Chamber did not qualify in this respect
even though it had no shareholders. Although the Chamber was a
non-profit membership organization just as the corporation in MCFL,
the Court distinguished it from Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
on the relative significance of its service functions. Membership in the
Chamber was attractive because of the additional services made avail-
able to members. Therefore, certain disincentives to disassociation
with the Chamber existed which had no relation to its political
stance. 55 The Court noted that the Chamber's political agenda was
"sufficiently distinct from its educational and outreach programs that
members who disagree with [its political expression] may continue to
pay dues to participate" in the non-political aspects of the organiza-
tion." 6 The majority thought that these more subtle disincentives to
renouncing membership were sufficient to result in the Chamber's
members being "more similar to shareholders of a business corpora-
tion than to the members of [Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.]'" 57
The majority went on to note that required disclosure would not
152. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1399 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264).
153. Id.
154. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264.
155. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1399.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1399 n.2. At least one dissenter, Justice Kennedy, seemed to think that since
membership was not related to one's livelihood, the Chamber's members were more like those
in MCFL. Id. at 1424 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
change the Chamber's character due to these disincentives.' 58
The third characteristic found by the Supreme Court to distin-
guish Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., from for-profit corpora-
tions-and more than any other, the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce as well-was "independence from the influence of business
corporations."'1 '9 The Court, through its focus on this characteristic,
displayed concern for the potential of entities subject to the influence
of business corporations to act as conduits for the "type of direct
spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace.'160 The
Court noted that Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., had no corpo-
rate members but "[iun striking contrast, more than three-quarters of
the Chamber's members [were] business corporations, whose political
contributions and expenditures can constitutionally be regulated by
the State."' 16 1
Thus, the majority in Austin concluded that none of the three
characteristics-a political corporate purpose, low barriers to disasso-
ciation, and independence from the influence of business-could be
attributed to the Chamber; therefore, the MCFL principle supporting
the protection of expressions by certain non-profit organizations
would not apply. '62 These three factors seemingly allow non-business
corporate entities, whose expressions might be expected to be more
closely aligned with the expectations of members or stockholders, to
avoid the application of a rule which limits corporate political activ-
ity. Essentially, the Court in MCFL attempted to avoid a wooden,
formalistic treatment of the corporation in favor of a more sensitive
scrutiny of the particular application of the corporate form.16 a
The Court's treatment of membership corporations emphasizes
the aggregate theory and displays little concern about the membership
corporation's status as an entity. Because membership corporations
are intended to be representational, this viewpoint appears appropri-
ate. 1 While the Court makes this seemingly correct theory selection,
158. Id. at 1399 n.2.
159. Id. at 1400.
160. Id.
161. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1400 (1990) (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976)).
162. Id. at 1398.
163. It becomes apparent from any attempt to regulate corporate activity that there is a
wide range of entities denominated as "corporations." These include public, non-public, non-
profit, for-profit, or membership. Each has certain common characteristics such as limited
liability or centralized management. The diversity of the nomenclature reflects the reality of
distinctions in nature, purpose, and effect on society.
164. Although this intent to be representational may be a key difference, it may not totally
eliminate the sociological factors which make a membership corporation's perspective and
communications different from those of the individuals of which it consists.
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it does so without express consideration and, instead, focuses upon
the elemental analysis first articulated in MCFL. This is not to sug-
gest any error in the elements themselves, but only to note that they
seem to derive from the overall characterization of the corporation as
an aggregate of its members rather than as an entity.
The Supreme Court then addressed the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce's contentions that the statute was not valid because of its
inclusion or exclusion of certain other organizations. 165 The Cham-
ber's challenges were twofold. First, it asserted that the statute's cov-
erage of corporations was underinclusive because labor unions were
not affected. Second, it argued that regulation specifically addressing
the fundamental right of speech failed to treat similarly situated enti-
ties in the same fashion and, therefore, did not comply with the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This argument relies on the non-regulation of unincor-
porated associations, as well as the non-regulation of media businesses
organized in the corporate form.
Addressing the underinclusiveness argument, the Supreme Court
found that the ability of union members to opt out of union political
activities was a sufficient basis for differential treatment. As to the
claim that the regulation singled out corporations over unincorpo-
rated associations, the Court found the state's decision to "regulate
only corporations [to be] precisely tailored to serve the compelling
state interest of eliminating from the political process the corrosive
effect of political 'war chests' amassed with the aid of the legal advan-
tages given to corporations." 166 With regard to the media exemption,
the Court noted that it "ensures that the Act does not hinder or pre-
vent the institutional press from reporting on and publishing editori-
als about newsworthy events" and that "although the press' unique
societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection under the
Constitution ... it does provide a compelling reason for the State to
exempt media corporations from the scope of political expenditure
limitations."'' 67 Similarly, though now in the face of the strict scru-
tiny standard imposed whenever a statutory classification impinges
upon a fundamental right, the Court rejected the equal protection
claim that regulation of corporations, but not unincorporated associa-
tions and media corporations, failed to treat similarly situated entities
equally. 168
165. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
166. Id. at 1401.
167. Id. at 1402.
168. Id. at 1401-02.
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The majority opinion is built on the premise that the state has a
compelling interest in protecting the political process from wealth
amassed pursuant to the "benefits of corporate law" 169 and expended
without a sufficient correlation between the views espoused by the
corporation and the views of those whose interests are represented by
the corporation. This compelling interest is measured against the
First Amendment principle that the individual's right either to speak
or to hear is fundamental. The Court's underlying conception of the
corporation as a natural entity helps to resolve the dissonance
between the state's perceived interest and the core First Amendment
principle. This conception, as understood by the Court, suggests that
corporations may hold positions with which their constituents disa-
gree.170  Therefore, the Court concludes that these entities do not
169. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, noted:
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets-that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources
in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments. These
state-created advantages not only allow corporations to play a dominant role in
the nation's economy, but also permit them to use "resources amassed in the
economic marketplace" to obtain "an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace."
Id. at 1397 (quoting FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 257
(1986)).
Previously, in Bellotti, the Court placed the burden on the legislature to establish that the
economic power of corporations actually threatened the integrity of the electoral process.
There the Court stated:
Appellee advances a number of arguments in support of his view that these
interests are endangered by corporate participation in discussion of a referendum
issue. They hinge upon the assumption that such participation would exert an
undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote, and-in the end--destroy
the confidence of the people in the democratic process and the integrity of the
government. According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and
their views may drown out other points of view. If appellee's arguments were
supported by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened
imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than
serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our
consideration.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789. In Austin, the Court authorized the restriction without any such
findings. The Court stated:
We emphasize that the mere fact that corporations may accumulate large
amounts of wealth is not the justification for § 54; rather, the unique state-con-
ferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries war-
rants the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth can unfairly
influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures,
just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions. We therefore
hold that the State has articulated a sufficiently compelling rationale to support
its restriction on independent expenditures by corporations.
Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
170. The Court's conceptual understanding of the for-profit corporation is distinguished in
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require First Amendment protection equal to that accorded to
individuals.
The key characteristic of the corporation in the Supreme Court's
analysis seems to be the separation and potential miscorrelation
between the expressions of the corporation and the positions of the
corporation's constituency. The Court is concerned with the alleged
unfairness to those minority shareholders or members who might dif-
fer with the expression of the corporation. However, there also seems
to be an overriding concern for the protection of society from the
effects of corporate participation in politics . 171
This general perception of the corporation differs from both the
aggregate and the fictional entity visions of the corporation. Obvi-
ously, the Court's adoption of an entity characterization distinguishes
it from an aggregate approach. Additionally, the Court's concern for
the interests and views of minority shareholders distinguishes its view
from the fictional entity theorist's position. Because fictional entity
theorists, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist, treat the corporation as
subordinate to the state, the majority's concern for this lack of align-
ment between the corporate entity and its supporters seems to set Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion outside of the fictional entity model. In fact,
this concern actually seems to be a veiled reference to the lack of
shareholder control over the actions of management, reminiscent of
the corporate persona debates during the early part of this century.
The goal of unregulated management, together with an entity concep-
tion of the corporation, casts the majority's model within the natural
entity paradigm.1 72 Interestingly, the differently constituted majori-
ties in both Austin and Bellotti adopt the natural entity conception of
the corporation. 173
MCFL from its view of non-profit ideological corporations. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986). Clearly, the Court views the latter as fundamentally a
representational body whose expressions are more directly tied to the views of its constituents.
171. The Court stated, "Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the
political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas." Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397. This new
"type of corruption" differs substantially from the quid pro quo type of corruption that
concerned the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27, 47 (1976), and Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
788 n.26.
172. See supra part II.B for discussion of the natural entity paradigm.
173. Presumably, the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist would dissent from the majority's
decision in Bellotti and sign on to Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Austin when the two
opinions adopt a similar conception of the corporation suggests that he disagreed with the
result in Bellotti and agreed with the result in Austin. His failure to concur separately in
Austin only serves to reinforce the concern expressed herein for the inexplicit adoption of
particular conceptions of the corporation. One would tend to doubt that Chief Justice
Rehnquist has changed his mind regarding his basic conception of the corporation. Once
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Austin generally employs the
natural entity theory of corporations. 174 However, on several Occa-
sions, an aggregate conception creeps almost inadvertently into his
analysis. For example, Justice Brennan considered the concerns of a
minority shareholder who disagreed with the political expression of
the corporation when he noted that "[a] stockholder might oppose the
use of corporate funds drawn from the general treasury-which repre-
sents, after all, his money-in support of a particular political candi-
date."'' I7  This view of the corporation as representing the
shareholders investment is reminiscent of the refrain "whose money is
it, anyway?" used by Judge Easterbrook whenever public policy is
argued as a justification for limiting the range of actions available to
corporate decisionmakers. 17 6 Second, in rejecting the underinclusive-
ness argument, Justice Brennan stated that "just as speech interests
are at their zenith in this area, so too are the interests of unwilling
Chamber members and corporate shareholders forced to subsidize
that speech."'' 77 Both of these statements imply an understanding of
the corporation as an aggregate of its constituents.
The doctrine suggests that when the corporation is viewed as an
entity, the shareholders have, as a group, certain decisionmaking
powers and, individually, certain claims to profits after dividends are
declared. Only upon dissolution do shareholders have any right to
the corporation's assets. 178 Moreover, after dissolution, the corpora-
tion's entity status is terminated. Recognizing the impact of theory
selection could eliminate the need for this analysis.
As might be expected of Justice Scalia, his opinion presented a
clear and consistent theoretical conception of the corporation.' 79 He
viewed the corporation as an aggregate of its members. Thus, he
again, the failure to focus on this fundamental question unravels the cogency of the opinion
thus undermining one's understanding of the Court's position on the nature of corporations.
174. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1404-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 1403 (emphasis added).
176. Frank Easterbrook, Lecture at the National Federalist Society Meeting on Corporate
Law (Fall 1989).
177. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1407 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
178. The availability of appraisal rights only generates an obligation of the corporation to
pay departing shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991) (describing
appraisal rights); MICH STAT. ANN § 450.1764 (Callaghan 1991) (identifying the events that
trigger dissenters' rights); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 13.01-13.28 (West 1991)
(describing procedures for the exercise of dissenters' rights).
179. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W.
RES L. REV. 581, 586-90 (1989-90). Scalia critiques Emerson's famous passage that includes
the statement that "[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." Ralph W.
Emerson, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS 66 (C.W. Eliot ed. 1909). Scalia
expresses his belief in the virtues of consistency characterizing the Emerson passage as
substantively "unmitigated nonsense," especially in the context of judicial decisionmaking.
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characterized state restriction of the members' expression as discrimi-
natory treatment of "that type of voluntary association known as a
corporation."'' 18 Throughout his critique of the majority opinion in
Austin, Justice Scalia compared corporations to other types of associa-
tions and wealthy individuals, neither of which achieve the legal sta-
tus of entities separate from the individual.'
Justice Scalia argued that Austin effectively overruled the Court's
decision in Buckley v. Valeo.182 He found no basis for distinguishing
the two cases. Justice Scalia's reluctance to distinguish these cases
derives directly from the incompatibility between the language found
in Buckley and his theoretical conception of the corporation. Because
the definitional language of the statute facially validated in Buckley
treated persons and virtually every other group, including corpora-
tions, ' in the same fashion, and because Justice Scalia viewed corpo-
rations as merely another sort of group or aggregation of individuals,
he found the results of Austin, which relate solely to corporations,
irreconcilable with Buckley.8 4
In rejecting the majority's characterization of the Michigan stat-
180. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1408 (Scalia J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1408-09.
Those individuals who form that type of voluntary association known as a
corporation are, to be sure, given special advantages-notably, the immunization
of their personal fortunes from liability for the action of the association-that the
State is under no obligation to confer. But so are other associations and private
individuals given all sorts of special advantages .... The categorical suspension
of the right of any person, or of any association of persons, to speak out on
political matters must be justified by a compelling state need.... Which is why
the Court puts forward its second bad argument, the fact that corporations
"amas[s] large treasuries." But that alone is also not sufficient justification for
the suppression of political speech, unless one thinks it would be lawful to
prohibit men and women whose net worth is above a certain figure from
endorsing political candidates.
Id. Because he does not distinguish between corporations, on the one hand, and individuals
and noncorporate organizations, on the other, Justice Scalia characterizes the majority in
obstreperous terms as "Orwellian" censors. Id. at 1408.
182. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Justice Scalia also forcefully argued that the majority's concern
with a "new" type of corruption arising from the size and misalignment of the interest of
shareholders and expenditures that could justify the state's limitation of corporate
expenditures may have eroded the theoretical underpinning of Bellotti, reversing it by
implication. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1414; see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26 (stating that there
is no concern that political contributions create political debt with referendums).
183. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 ("The statute defines 'person' broadly to include 'an
individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation or any other organization or
group of persons.' ").
184. The congressional choice to draft legislation in a way that treated corporations and
other groups and individuals in the same fashion, though found facially valid upon challenge
before the Supreme Court, simply did not raise the issue of whether Congress or the states
could make a different choice.
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ute as protecting shareholders, Justice Scalia described his under-
standing of the machinations of corporations:
A person becomes a member of that form of association known as
a for-profit corporation in order to pursue economic objectives, i.e.,
to make money. Some corporate charters may specify the line of
commerce to which the company is limited, but even that can be
amended by shareholder vote. Thus, in joining such an associa-
tion, the shareholder knows that management may take any action
that is ultimately in accord with what the majority (or a specified
supermajority) of the shareholders wishes, so long as that action is
designed to make a profit. That is the deal. The corporate actions
to which the shareholder exposes himself, therefore, include many
things that he may find politically or ideologically uncongenial:
investment in South Africa, operation of an abortion clinic, publi-
cation of a pornographic magazine, or even publication of a news-
paper that adopts absurd political views and makes catastrophic
political endorsements. His only protections against such assaults
upon his ideological commitments are (1) his ability to persuade a
majority (or the requisite minority) of his fellow shareholders that
the action should not be taken, and ultimately (2) his ability to sell
his stock. 8 5
Justice Scalia thus endorses the aggregate view of the corporation.
When he says "[t]hat is the deal," Justice Scalia asserts that the
essence of the corporation is a contract. In this conceptual view, indi-
viduals connect themselves pursuant to contracts under the riuibric of
the corporation. The terms of these agreements and individual eco-
nomic advantage orchestrate individual activity. If there is disgrun-
tlement, then the individual must resolve it through the options
specified in these various contracts. In Justice Scalia's view, individu-
als are free to engage, not engage, or disengage from the corporate
venture under the terms of the agreements that bind them and the
market at the time.
This theoretical conception of the corporation leads Justice
Scalia to visualize the corporation as merely another group of individ-
uals contending in the public debate. 86 Therefore, he ultimately
185. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1412 (emphasis added). In many instances, persuasion of other
shareholders may be ineffective since the corporation is run by its board with the assistance of
management. The control that Justice Scalia refers to here, pursuant to the theoretical line of
analysis that his opinion follows, is the market for corporate control. The problem with any
reference to such a market is the difficulty of imagining circumstances under which attempts to
take over the corporation would be generated by the marginal economic impact of corporate
political expression.
186. As Justice Scalia states in Austin:
The premise of our Bill of Rights, however, is that there are some things-
even some seemingly desirable things-that government cannot be trusted to do.
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rejects the majority position because of his skepticism toward empow-
ering the government to limit corporate expression.1I 7 This expresses
an aggregate conception of the corporation in which the corporate
structural overlay essentially is transparent, devoid of any values or
perceptions contrary to those of the individuals involved. 18
The very first of these is establishing the restrictions upon speech that will assure
"fair" political debate. The incumbent politician who says he welcomes full and
fair debate is no more to be believed than the entrenched monopolist who says he
welcomes full and fair competition. Perhaps the Michigan legislature was
genuinely trying to assure a "balanced" presentation of political views; on the
other hand, perhaps it was trying to give unincorporated unions (a not
insubstantial force in Michigan) political advantage over major employers. Or
perhaps it was trying to assure a "balanced" presentation because it knows that
with evenly balanced speech incumbent officeholders generally win. The
fundamental approach of the First Amendment, I had always thought, was to
assume the worst, and to rule the regulation of political speech "for fairness'
sake" simply out of bounds.
Id. at 1415.
187. Id. at 1415-16. Justice Scalia discussed de Tocqueville's 1835 statement regarding the
role of government, associations, and individuals in the public debate:
Ah, but there is the special element of corporate wealth: What would the
Founders have thought of that? They would have endorsed, I think, what
Tocqueville wrote in 1835:
When the members of an aristocratic community adopt a new opinion or
conceive a new sentiment, they give it a station, as it were, beside themselves,
upon the lofty platform where they stand; and opinions or sentiments so
conspicuous to the eyes of the multitude are easily introduced into the minds or
hearts of all around. In democratic countries the governing power alone is
naturally in a condition to act in this manner; but it is easy to see that its action is
always inadequate, and often dangerous. . . . No sooner does a government
attempt to go beyond its political sphere and to enter upon this new track than it
exercises even unintentionally, an insupportable tyranny .... Worse still will be
the case if the government really believes itself interested in preventing all
circulation of ideas; it will then stand motionless and oppressed by the heaviness
of voluntary torpor. Governments, therefore, should not be the only active
powers; associations ought, in democratic nations, to stand in lieu of those
powerful private individuals whom the equality of conditions has swept away.
... While Tocqueville was discussing "circulation of ideas" in general, what he
wrote is also true of candidate endorsements in particular. To eliminate
voluntary associations-not only including powerful ones, but especially
including powerful ones-from the public debate is either to augment the always
dominant power of government or to impoverish the public debate.
Id. (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 109 (Bradley ed. 1948)).
Given Justice Scalia's adherence to more modern views, such as public choice theory, it is
interesting that he would reference theories announced before the complexities of our society,
such as today's multinational management corporation, began to unfold.
188. See Romano, supra note 49, at 940-41. Romano describes several different models
that explain corporate structure normatively and descriptively. Her discussion of pluralism
appears to confirm Justice Scalia's view that the individual is free to enter or exist the
corporate form at any time. Romano believes that the pluralist views the corporate form as a
shell for the efficient channelling of individual preferences. Id. If corporate participants are
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B. The Significance of the Corporate Conception Evidenced in
Bellotti and Austin
At least one justice has substantially adhered to each of the his-
torically significant theoretical perspectives of the corporation. In
both Bellotti and Austin, the majority inexplicitly but substantially
adopted a natural entity corporate conception. 189 Justice White and
Chief Justice Rehnquist expressly adopted fictional entity understand-
ings of the corporate persona in their dissents in Bellotti. Finally, Jus-
tice Scalia used an aggregate conception of the corporation in his
dissent in Austin. While the opinions of Scalia, White, and Rehnquist
expressly embrace a particular conception of the corporation, as
opposed to the two majority opinions, only Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia rigorously retain their theoretical perspective
throughout their opinions, and only the Chief Justice explains his the-
ory selection.
Logically, unless First Amendment doctrine is unresponsive to
the distinctions in conceptual characterization, and thus treats corpo-
rations exactly the same as individuals, some conception of the subject
under regulation, here corporations, is inescapable. 190 In fact, even if
the Supreme Court's First Amendment doctrine is somehow unre-
sponsive to these distinctions, it still assumes some conception of the
corporation. The doctrine would reflect the adoption, over other
available theories, of a conception of the corporation as a person or
dissatisfied with the organization's collective choices, the free market allows them to disengage
from that particular corporate venture and look elsewhere. Id. at 945.
189. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1404-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
190. The Court's First Amendment treatment of school children illustrates how its analysis
depends on the subject being regulated. In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 505, 506 (1969), the Court began its opinion by recognizing that minor school
children do retain First Amendment rights; however, the parameters of those rights depend on
the extent to which they "collide with the rules of the school authorities." Id. at 507. After
balancing these competing interests, the Court held that the school may proscribe student
speech that "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others." Id. at 513; see also Bethel School Dist. Number 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
677-78 (1986). In Fraser, a student had been punished for making a sexually suggestive speech
at a school assembly. The Court stated that "the constitutional rights of students in public
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults." Id. at 682. The Court
noted that the proper role of a public school is to inculcate fundamental values that disfavor
offensive or vulgar language. Id. at 683. Because of this function, the school's restriction on
Fraser's speech was acceptable.
In these cases, the Court's analysis depends, to a large extent, on its vision of the speakers,
here children. Had the Court simply applied the traditional First Amendment analysis
governing speech by adults, the protection afforded in both of these cases would have been
broader in scope. Because of the Court's view of children and the role of school in society, the
Court narrowed students' free speech protection. This analogy aptly suggests that courts
consider the nature of corporations in order to limit the scope of corporate First Amendment
rights to something less than adult First Amendment rights.
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group of persons.'91
Each justice's particular theory of the corporation affects their
view of the First Amendment protection appropriately accorded cor-
porate speech. The fictional entity and aggregate conceptions nearly
dictate conclusions concerning speech rights. One who views the cor-
poration as purely a creature of state statute, as does Chief Justice
Rehnquist, limits First Amendment values to the public interest in a
free exchange of ideas. Values of self-expression and self-defense via
advocacy would be inapplicable. Given this perspective, First
Amendment justifications for corporate protection are limited. Not
surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White reach the
conclusion that the scope of First Amendment protection for corpora-
tions is not as extensive as that available to individuals.
Justice Scalia's vision of the corporation as merely another form
of group behavior limits the possibility of distinguishing between the
First Amendment rights of individuals and those of corporations. For
example, in Bellotti, the Court validated the state's concern that cor-
porate speech might potentially "drown out" the views of the popu-
lous. 192 No justice in Bellotti retained an aggregate conception of the
corporation, but it would be hard to imagine an aggregate theorist's
acceptance of this view of the First Amendment. Under such a corpo-
rate conceptualization, there is little principled basis for discriminat-
ing. between individual and corporate contributions to the
overwhelming mass of communication.
The natural entity theory, however, lies between the two polar
positions of the aggregate and the fictional entity theories. It recog-
nizes a distinction between individuals and the corporation and
respects the significance of individual initiative and participation in
the venture. Precisely because the natural entity conception exists in
a gray area between the other theories, it yields more flexibility in
distinguishing between the rights of individuals and of corporations.
To the same extent, the dual aspects of this middle-ground perspec-
tive explain the apparent inconsistency between Austin and prior
cases. 1
93
191. DAN-COHEN, supra note 95, at 27 ("[W]e must make some pre-legal cognitive peace
with the phenomenon of the organization before we can intelligibly tackle the question of its
appropriate normative treatment.").
192. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784; see also supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
Although the Court validated this concern, it rejected the state's argument because of a lack of
proof.
193. As suggested by Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rhenquist, and others, the respect
accorded individual participation in a separate entity is inherently conflicting. See Jill E.
Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of
Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 614 (1991) ("Apart from the
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Given these influences, corporate legal theory potentially deter-
mines the application of First Amendment principles to corporations.
However, to assert that conceptualizations may determine the difficult
and manipulable principles of First Amendment doctrine seems to fly
in the face of legal realism and, more recently, critical legal studies
("CLS") scholarship, which deny that rules or concepts may be deter-
minative of legal decisions. Both schools tend to view rules and con-
cepts as cloaking the more significant policy choices that underlie
legal decisions. However, based upon the forgoing analysis, it appears
that corporate legal theory has some determinative bite.194
One scholar has described the influence of corporate theory as
affecting the "'iconic' dimension of legal and political dispute."' 93
This approach classifies the influence of corporate theory as rhetori-
cal. However, where the object of constitutional analysis is ab initio a
legal conceptualization, as with the corporation, the significance of its
theoretical characterization is more than merely rhetorical. The
choice of a particular corporate paradigm, in fact, forms part of the
policy analysis that the legal realist and CLS devotees advocate.
Therefore, as these movements suggest, the policy analysis underlying
the various conceptual choices should be explicit.
The application of the First Amendment to corporate expression
poses three somewhat distinct questions. Two of these questions sub-
stantially depend upon the decisionmaker's choice of corporate para-
digm. First, it is important to determine whether the corporation is a
representational body or a separate entity having an independent per-
spective. Were one to categorize corporations as essentially represen-
tational bodies, then the Supreme Court's treatment of the
corporation in MCFL would be appropriate for all corporations. The
apparent inconsistency of the Austin decision with the Court's earlier rulings ... the opinion
leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the court has pulled something ... out of its
hat"); see also supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text. This approach does, however, allow
the Court to select from a larger set of First Amendment values than either of the other
perspectives.
194. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (describing the debate between Bratton,
Millon, and Horwitz over the significance of corporate legal theory to corporate doctrine and
practice).
195. Hager, supra note 36, at 576.
"Iconic" dimensions of legal conceptualization always lay behind the formalist
sophistry of "legal reasoning" and they persist undiminished in our
contemporary age of skepticism concerning legal logic. Attention to this iconic
dimension helps explain why decisions on a given cluster of issues might
consistently "tilt" toward one side or the other, even though the logical
apparatus deployed in articulating the decisions can easily be shown as
indeterminate and "flippable" to favor opposite outcomes.
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second important question is whether a concern for minority partici-
pants in the corporate venture should justify corporate speech regula-
tion. The third question is whether the First Amendment value of a
free flow of ideas is sufficient to justify the protection of corporate
speech, and if so, how much protection should be afforded. Although
one's vision of the corporation may seem unrelated to this final ques-
tion, the value attached to hearing corporate speech may depend on a
particular world view and how corporations fit within it. As previ-
ously discussed, the various corporate paradigms refect a particular
world view. Therefore, while this third question does not involve cor-
porate legal theory per se, the choice of a particular legal theory may
indicate a certain attitude toward this issue as well. 196
Corporate legal theory essentially determines whether corpora-
tions are representational. Under a fictional entity conception they
are not. This vision all but ignores the participation of individuals
within the corporation. Conversely, an aggregate vision anticipates
that the end results of the atomistic transactions within the corporate
structure derive from choices made by shareholders. Therefore, the
speech that emanates from the corporate structure would represent
the interests of shareholders.
The natural entity characterization, though it recognizes the con-
tribution of individuals to the corporate venture, sees corporate
speech as reflective of managerial choices, and not necessarily of
derivative shareholder desires. Under a natural entity characteriza-
tion, if there is miscorrelation between the interests of shareholders
and management, the issue is whether corporate speech represents
individual interests. The natural entity theorist would answer affirma-
tively but note that the individuals represented by such speech have
the opportunity to fund their expression with capital provided by
other individuals whose interests this speech in no way represents.
Under the natural entity view, the issue of representation devolves
into the significance of any miscorrelation between the views of share-
holders and the expression of the corporation.
As to the significance of the minority's subsidization of corporate
views with which it disagrees, the natural entity conception recog-
nizes that managerial discretion allows management to fund corpo-
rate expressions not supported by either majority or minority
shareholders. Theorists supporting this perspective might favor exter-
nal regulation of corporate expressions because of a concern for the
extent of managerial discretion, not because of concern for minority
196. For a discussion of research suggesting this connection, see supra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text.
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subsidization of divergent corporate expressions alone. Interestingly,
neither of the other theories seem to be as concerned with this issue.
The fictional entity theory ignores shareholder interests as expressed
through the corporation. One who conceives of corporations in this
way, therefore, would view the concerns of minority shareholders as
disconnected from the expressions of the corporation. Under the
aggregate theory, such shareholders would weigh the economic bene-
fits of association against the injury inflicted by the corporation's
espousal of views with which they disagree. While it recognizes dis-
cordant shareholder views, the aggregate theory would take the posi-
tion that regulations should not be designed to correct any
miscorrelation between minority views and corporate expression.
The two questions directly related to one's conception of
corporateness-whether the corporation is a representational body,
and whether minority participants deserve special concern-are dic-
tated by one's view. One who conceives of corporations as fictions,
like Chief Justice Rehnquist does, finds no representational quality in
the nature of corporateness and, therefore, is not concerned for
minority subsidization. Further, such a view characterizes corpora-
tions as subservient to state authority, and would, like Chief Justice
Rehnquist,1 97 authorize governmental restriction of corporate polit-
ical speech. Under this paradigm, nothing further would be consid-
ered and the third question would not even arise. Conversely, an
aggregate perception sees the corporation as representational to the
extent of the various deals made within the corporate structure, and
views minority speech concerns as resolved by the private ordering
that makes up the corporate structure. Given this premise, aggregate
theory's proponents would reject state regulation of corporate
speech.' 98 Finally, the natural entity conception of corporateness
would not perceive the corporation as representational, but generally
would support restrictions on managerial discretion. The skeptical
attitude toward corporate management evinced by natural entity the-
orists generally suggests a favorable view towards state regulation of
corporate speech.
Given the significance of the particular conception selected, it is
important to consider the factors which determine the applicability of
197. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Bellotti and joined in the majority opinion in
Austin. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822-28 (1977); Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce v. Austin, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1394 (1990). Justice White also adopts the fictional
entity theory, but bases his decision more on the issue that I have identified as the third
question than on his conception of the corporation. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 802-22.
198. Justice Scalia, the Court's only proponent of this view, did in fact take such a position.
See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1408-16.
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a particular theoretical conception. Also, given the array of positions
adhered to by the various justices, it is important to examine current
perspectives on the corporation and its role in society.
IV. THE CORPORATE CONCEPTIONS THAT APPLY TO FIRST
AMENDMENT ISSUES
The foregoing analysis indicates that a significant factor in the
Court's corporate free speech holdings is the theoretical conception of
the corporation harbored by each justice. The lack of explication
leaves many questions open. Considering the significance of concept
selection and the lack of any thorough explanation of the justices'
positions, one wonders how such clear differences in the concept of
the corporation could go unexplored.1 99 Within the scope of this
Article, however, it is necessary to examine whether the corporate
theory used to resolve issues involving corporate free speech should be
selected on the basis of the descriptive reality presented in each case
or on the basis of other normative goals.
While the question may also involve issues beyond the scope of
this Article, such as concerns for judicial activism, two points are
clear. First, normatively driven selections can only be made within
the set of descriptively plausible corporate conceptions. For example,
if the fictional entity conception is descriptively inaccurate, then no
policy goal could justify using it. However, among a set of descrip-
tively accurate conceptions, such as an aggregate theory or a natural
entity conception, normative policy considerations are important.
Therefore, corporate conceptual analysis may operate to affect out-
comes in two ways: (1) narrowing the set of conceptions to the set of
descriptively plausible alternatives, and (2) assisting in the assessment
of policy objectives.
While only Chief Justice Rehnquist provided an explanation for
the selection of his theory, each justice inculcated a view of the corpo-
rate persona as a fundamental underlying principle in support of his
opinion. 200 Unfortunately, in certain instances, the lack of explication
199. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, although staking out their respective
conceptions as fundamental to their decisions, do not make explicit reference to the divergent
perspectives evidenced in the opinions with which they disagree.
200. There are at least three explanations for the justices' failure to explain their choices of
a theory describing the nature of the corporation. The justices may have been unaware of the
scholarship that traces the development of these theories or their own varying yet inexplicit
acceptance of such views. This possibility would seem, however, to underestimate their
perceptiveness. After all, each of the various models has at least one proponent on the Court
and presumably these models did not just occur to each justice a priori. Assuming that the
failure to explicate the theoretical underpinnings of their decisions has not been due to mere
naivete, two other possible reasons come to mind: (1) that the theoretical debate may not
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resulted in inadvertent inconsistency. In those instances, reference to
the primary theoretical vision would have provided a more solid foun-
dation for reaching the justice's result than the partial analysis ulti-
mately given.20 1 The question then would become whether such
inconsistency is inappropriate and whether a more integrated theo-
retical framework would provide a better basis for judicial
decisionmaking.
Certainly, the application of an integrated theoretical framework
would provide a clearer understanding of the reasons for the judicial
decision.2 °2 This, however, does not require the Court to adopt a sin-
gle, unaltering theoretical conception and apply it uniformly across
circumstances and issues. There are different types of corporations,
including for-profit, non-profit, public, closely held, membership, and
stock corporations. Although in many instances these different cor-
porate forms are governed by different state statutes, they each retain
the essential feature of existence under the law which is, to some
degree, separate and apart from its incorporators. The Court's treat-
ment of MCFL judicially recognizes that corporations are not a mon-
olith of indistinguishable legal constructs. This descriptive reality
narrows the normative alternatives.
Because of underlying policy concerns, particular corporate con-
ceptions may be appropriate for certain types of legal issues but inap-
propriate for others. For example, the contractarian approach
appear to the justices to increase the potential for culling a majority of the Court; or (2) that
the formalist orientation of the Court leads it to resolve cases on First Amendment grounds
rather than addressing matters traditionally left to state law. See Nicholas Zeppos, Judicial
Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 406-12 (1989) (discussing the search
for legitimacy in judicial decisionmaking). Though intriguing, consideration of these practical
considerations ignores the more significant question of which point of view has validity and
will stand up under the scrutiny of explicit judicial consideration.
201. For discussion of the specific shifts in corporate conception made, presumably
unconsciously, in both Bellotti and Austin, see supra notes 83-85, 103-07, 164-73 and
accompanying text.
202. The debate regarding judicial candor has seriously challenged the traditional approach
to statutory interpretation, which focuses on legislative intent. JAMES W. HURST, DEALING
WITH STATUTES 32 (1982). Guido Calabresi has gone so far as to assert that judges should
interpret statutes to comport with present day experience, and in so doing, eliminate the
justifications that obscure the true basis for their decisions. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-32, 179-80 (1982). David Shapiro takes a more
conservative approach and argues that although judges should base judicial rules on principles,
it is also legitimate for them to consider policy grounds and fill gaps when necessary. David
Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 556-58 (1988). On the
other hand, Nicholas Zeppos asserts that the judicial decisionmaking process frustrates
candor. He states that it may be just as difficult for judges to distinguish between "real" and
"false" bases for their opinions as it is to discover "true" legislative intent under an originalist
approach. Zeppos, supra note 200, at 407, 411, 412. The debate focuses on the problems
involved in achieving candor while not seriously questioning the value of judicial candor itself.
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adopted by Justice Scalia in Austin may be appropriate for addressing
the relationship between management and shareholders in a public
corporation,203 because of a certain congruence between the aggregate
conception and policy objectives affecting the regulation of the share-
holder-management relationship. The focus of the aggregate concep-
tion is the achievement of the efficiency objective, and this goal
justifies management discretion over corporate action. The harmony
between the goals of shareholder-management regulation and the
aggregate conception suggests the propriety of employing the aggre-
gate conception in such cases. However, whether an aggregate con-
ception should apply to the question of corporate free speech depends
upon whether efficiency is a virtue where corporate participation in
political discourse is concerned. While efficiency may generally be a
good thing, the core protection provided by the First Amendment is
participation by the individual in public discourse about government.
To the extent that the efficiency objective undermines this core goal, it
becomes a less important concern for theory selection.
In other situations, it may be appropriate to use an aggregate
conception of the corporation. For example, federal environmental
legislation seems to treat corporations as aggregates.2" Here, liability
is not merely compartmentalized within the corporate structure; lia-
bility may extend to a very broad array of corporate constituents,
including directors, prior and current controlling shareholders, man-
agers, parent corporations, and lending institutions. Because the leg-
islature deems protection of the environment so significant, it has
designed regulations to make all participants in the corporate venture
potentially liable. Apparently, Congress found that the fictional
entity approach, which would have cabined liability within the entity
203. In Austin, Justice Scalia states that Justice Brennan's concern that corporate funds will
be used to support a candidate whom shareholders oppose is not a legitimate basis for
restricting corporate speech. He asserts that when people become stockholders, they know
that management may take action that only a majority of shareholders support. Under this
construct, the appropriate remedy for dissatisfied shareholders is either to persuade a majority
to change management's action or to sell their stock. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1411 (1990). The nexus of the contract model of the firm suggests
that this construct may, in fact, be appropriate both normatively and descriptively. New
economic theorists minimize the importance of the hierarchical nature of the corporation by
emphasizing the voluntary nature of corporate participation. The participant surrenders some
decisionmaking power in exchange for efficiency. "[A] participating rational economic actor
who dislikes the terms of the deal offered can walk away and find an arrangement that better
suits him." Bratton, supra note 15, at 455.
204. See George W. Dent, Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 151, 152-56 (1991) (focusing upon the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Correction, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.§§ 9601-9675 (1988)). See generally
Symposium, Environmental Law and the Corporate Entity, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. I
(1991).
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structure and protected many of the corporate constituents, would be
normatively inappropriate.
Thus, the proper response to the question, "What are corpora-
tions?" may be dictated by the context in which the question is posed.
Where the context is shareholder-management relations, the efficiency
objective may support an aggregate orientation. Where the context is
environmental regulation, the prophylactic policy objectives may
make a fictional entity conception wholly inappropriate. Where the
context is the regulation of corporate speech, the objectives of the
First Amendment must be considered when selecting the appropriate
vision of the corporate persona. Had the justices thoroughly consid-
ered the basis for theory selection in Austin and Bellotti, they would
have addressed many of the concerns raised in this Article, and
applied the theories they selected more consistently, or possibly
reconsidered them.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist firmly and expressly based his
opinion upon the fictional entity theory, he did so without expressly
considering the basis for its application. Moreover, he stated the
applicability of the theory without analysis. Interestingly, the theory
he applies reflects what some might consider an antiquated, descrip-
tively inaccurate picture of the corporation. The fictional entity con-
ception arises from the concession theory, in which the sovereign
privatized monopolies via corporate charters. Under concession the-
ory the state's role was paramount because its discretion was neces-
sary for the creation of a corporation. The passage of general
incorporation statutes, however, rendered this theory obsolete. No
longer is there any meaningful state involvement in the creation of a
corporation. Mere ministerial recordation does not constitute a con-
cession from the sovereign, 20 5 although the establishment of a corpo-
ration, or its equivalent, is not possible without such ministerial
action. The liability limitation simply is not attainable by contract
because potential creditors would not prospectively waive their rights
against the would-be incorporators.
On the other hand, corporations operate pursuant to corporate
statutes that theoretically could establish the state dominance neces-
sary for the fictional entity theory to be viable. These statutes, how-
ever, are largely enabling statutes that promote private action
beneficial to society at large. One might question whether state
205. See William W. Bratton, Jr., Welfare and Good Will in Corporate Fiduciary Law 116-
39 (Summer 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (seeking to establish "a
framework for public justification of fiduciary constraint that avoids reliance on the moribund
notion of the corporation as a delegation of sovereign authority").
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antitakeover legislation that has proliferated since CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corporation of America206 is as a reassertion of state domi-
nance over corporations.20 7 Although the fictional entity theory may
not accurately depict the current descriptive reality of corporate exist-
ence, it fairly describes the allocation of power between state and fed-
eral authority as it relates to corporations. Therefore, the propriety of
a fictional entity conception depends upon state legislative choices.
State legislative choices are affected by more than the collective
wisdom of state legislators about the appropriate characterization of
the corporate persona. The incorporators decide where to incorpo-
rate, based primarily upon the nature of state corporate regulation.
The dynamics of legislative and individual choices have been
described as the "Race to the Bottom," or the interstate market for
corporate charters. This market may be the primary constraint on
state legislative choices, and most probably is responsible for current
legislation. The resulting mix of state legislative authority and the
market for corporate charters limits the potential applicability of the
fictional entity concept and suggests the descriptive accuracy of a nat-
ural entity conception.
The majority positions in Austin and Bellotti both inexplicably
embrace the natural entity paradigm. Under this view, management
has enormous unchecked power. For example, management's author-
ity to make political expenditures is substantially unfettered. This is
true as long as the expenditure is small relative to the size of the cor-
poration and management can at least articulate some basis upon
which the expenditure might benefit the corporation. Under this par-
adigm, collective action problems mitigate against shareholder action
to check management control.20 8 Therefore, this view continues to
206. 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (validating state's power to control share voting of corporations
created pursuant to state's laws).
207. As a matter of political reality, a more accurate description may be that large
corporations dominate various state legislatures, co-opting state power for the protection of
corporate management. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of
Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 96, 116-117 (1987) (arguing that, in reality, legislature passed statute deterring hostile
takeovers in order to protect its tax base); David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of
Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903 (1988).
208. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, A Symposium on Campaign Fiance: The Dilemma of Election
Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HoFSTRA L. REV. 213, 260 (1989). Gottlieb describes
disincentives to collective action as flowing "from problems created by the differences between
special and general interests. The larger the group of people that must be involved in any
activity, the more difficult it is to organize the effort." Id. As a result, the marginal cost to any
individual for expending the energy to organize the effort is likely to be higher than the
expected return for that particular individual. Therefore, economic incentives are insufficient
to motivate anyone to challenge or possibly even monitor management on matters such as
political expenditures, where the return is simply the prevention of such behavior in the future.
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apply to matters, such as political expenditures, where management's
reign goes substantially unchecked.
Given the deeply imbedded legislative inclination to regulate cor-
porate participation in the political discourse and the orientation of
the natural entity paradigm toward regulating management discre-
tion, there is a clear congruence between the legislative policy choice
and the natural entity paradigm. This, however, does not consider
the relationship between the normative objectives of the First Amend-
ment and the characteristics of a natural entity paradigm. It is impor-
tant to remember that this paradigm respects both the power of the
state and the initiative of the individual. In so doing, it maintains
substantial flexibility. Given the alternatives, this paradigm probably
would accommodate the array of First Amendment policy goals that
the Court seems to seek.
Turning to Justice Scalia's contractual view of the corporation, it
is important to consider the normative objective which was employed
in developing the aggregate paradigm. Under that view, the corporate
entity is essentially a set of contractual relationships. The guiding
principle is that corporate regulation should enhance the efficiency of
the transactions constituting the corporate structure.2 °9 This neoclas-
sical economic analysis probably represents the dominant academic
model of the corporation today.21°
While under neoclassical economic analysis the market for cor-
porate control checks the authority of management, this check may
not be reliable or sensitive to relatively small political expenditures by
the corporation. Given the collapse of the junk bond market and the
proliferation of state anti-takeover statutes, barriers to hostile take-
over efforts have become fairly daunting. The extent of these barriers,
in addition to the equally significant transaction costs associated with
See also Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
10, 12-16 (1991) (describing this problem and arguing that political constraints have been
primary factors precluding evolution to more responsive vehicle for capital accumulation).
209. See Millon, supra note 2, at 230 (noting that if there is role for legal rules under nexus
of contracts model, it is to "provide mandatory contract terms designed to lessen agency costs
by discouraging mismanagement").
210. See, e.g., Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private
Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327 (1979); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976); Kraakman, supra note 43; see also Bratton, supra note 15, at 408 n.6
(stating that analysis under contractarian model has become "commonplace"). Bratton states
that the contractualist language appeared in legal literature during the 1970s, and that it has
been widely accepted since 1980. Bratton, supra note 8, at 1476. Indeed, the prevalence of this
model is so wide, that its opponents have felt compelled to join the debate. See, e.g.,
Symposium, American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
495 (1984); Clark, supra note 46, at 55-79.
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hostile takeover, may prevent a hostile takeover due to management's
misuse of power for even relatively significant political contributions.
So, the principal challenge to the managerialist paradigm provided by
this economist vision-the market for corporate control-is likely to
be both an unreliable and unresponsive means of checking manage-
ment control over the vast capital that corporations manage.
Oddly, Justice Scalia does not refer to the principle of efficiency.
Instead, he rejects the statute in Austin because it limits the rights of
individuals to form corporate entities for the purpose of participating
in the political debate by making contributions or independent
expenditures. 21  The freedom of contract aspect of the contractarian-
neoclassical view is the basis for his analysis. There are, however,
limits on the contractarian acceptance of freedom of contract. In fact,
the freedom of contract aspect of the contractarian analysis is purely a
means to achieve the ultimate contractarian goal, efficiency.21 2
If, however, efficiency in the broad sense had been considered,
the statute in Austin might yield more efficiency. Segregated accounts
for political contributions and independent political expenditures
would separate their function from the corporate form and require
management to compete in the market for contributions to political
action committees and the like. This market discipline is likely to be
more efficient than management's uncontrolled expenditures.
21 3
211. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1409 n. 10. Compare FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
(MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986) (holding that, because corporation in MCFL "was formed
to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital," regulation of political expenditures was
unconstitutional as applied).
212. The efficiency goal is typically served by allowing the parties to seek the terms that best
fit their particular objectives. Contractualists typically argue for corporate statutes that
present a standard form agreement to which the parties would have agreed ex ante, but the
flexibility of allowing the parties to modify the terms of this standard form agreement is also an
integral part of this approach. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820
(1989) (arguing from contractualist perspective for certain limits upon freedoms allowed
parties in drafting corporate charters).
213. If one defines inefficient political expenditures as those authorized by management to
protect its own interests at the expense of shareholders (for example, state anti-takeover statute
lobbying), and if one were to assume that management made a relatively insignificant amount
of selfless political expenditures, inefficient expenditures would increase without the Austin-
type regulation. Under the traditional doctrine, which allowed such expenditures as long as
there were any articulable benefits to the corporation, such expenditures would not even enter
the investment analysis of prospective investors because they would be insignificant in
comparison to the assets and income of the corporation generally. Under the Michigan
statute, since such expenditures would have to be separately attracted and accounted for, the
level of significant expenditure would be substantially less. Further, rational potential
contributors would compare political action committees to find the particular fund that has the
lowest percentage of "inefficient contributions." Therefore, under the Michigan statute, not
only would there be a greater correlation between the contributors' interests and the
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Justice Scalia has taken the contractarian view of the corporation
and argued that limitations on corporate freedom of speech constrain
those contracting in the context of the corporate venture. If segregat-
ing contribution funds from the corporate venture resulted in their
less efficient utilization, then Justice Scalia's concern that government
not be allowed to limit speech might be more consistent with the basis
of his contractarian theory. However, because segregation is likely to
increase the efficiency of the funds used, there may well be more funds
available for corporate expression; hence, more expression would be
encouraged.
This analysis begs the question whether the efficiency-based
aggregate conception is appropriate for the resolution of corporate
First Amendment questions. The analysis must focus on the norma-
tive value of efficiency and core First Amendment concerns. If we
view these concerns as protecting speech related to various aspects of
the nature of government and involving individual consent to be gov-
erned, then one might wonder whether efficiency relates at all to indi-
vidual expression.
Justice Scalia implicitly suggests that corporations represent the
interests of individuals and, therefore, silencing corporate speech in
this way benefits incumbent politicians. This conclusion is descrip-
tively inaccurate. Professor Dan-Cohen has identified the judiciary's
tendency to cast organizations generally on the side of individuals in a
somewhat bipolar analytical framework pitting individuals against the
government. 21 4 Dan-Cohen relates the issue, in part, to the question
expenditure, but also less inefficiency in the expenditure of funds for the support of those
issues.
If one defines inefficient political expenditures as those authorized by management
primarily to protect its own interests, and one assumes World A allows corporations to make
such expenditures and World B has a Michigan-type regulation, it becomes apparent that
World A would have more inefficient expenditures. In World A, the investor-contributor
resource allocation, even assuming perfect information, would require weighing expected
corporate income against the amount of inefficient expenditure as well as comparison to other
investment alternatives. Therefore, the longer the anticipated corporate return is above the
market average, the greater license managers have to make such expenditures. In World B,
the Michigan statute would require corporate political funds to compete for contribution
dollars based solely upon the contributor's interest in the position espoused by the fund. Any
inefficiency in actual expenditures would undermine the basis for contributions. There would
be no trade-off between earnings and the espoused position.
214. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 95. Dan-Cohen identifies a tendency of courts to
presume a bipolar discourse between government and individuals, with corporations and other
organizations cast on the side of or as representative of individual interests. Dan-Cohen treats
this as a problem because he recognizes that this tendency misconceives reality; sociological
evidence indicates that individuals behave differently in the context of organizations and that
organizations develop and carry out agendas that are separate and apart from their conponent
individuals. He suggests solutions to this problem which, in large part, presume a certain
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of how the rights of corporations are derived. If one views corpora-
tions as entities whose rights derive from the rights of their sharehold-
ers, then Justice Scalia's reasoning would have merit. Assuming that
the stockholder group were made up of individuals, a fact subject to
some controversy, it remains highly questionable whether large, gen-
eral purpose corporate entities represent, in any real sense, the inter-
ests of individuals.215
On the other hand, if, as Dan-Cohen suggests, the corporate
entity and other organizational forms represent a third perspective
unlike those of either government or individuals, then there might be
a different conclusion: the actions of corporate entities occur
independent of any particular individual.21 6 Therefore, corporate
entities represent a third perspective to which society might assign a
certain priority. 217 Little reason exists, however, to regard this prior-
ity as equivalent to that assigned to individual speech.
Although an individual may draft the statements and positions
that emanate from the corporate structure, that individual will
undoubtedly be affected, in significant part, by aspects of the corpo-
rate structure. Group involvement generally affects individual behav-
ior. Moreover, the view that corporations represent individual
understanding of the nature and role of large corporations in society and advocate an
adjustment of our jurisprudence to take into account his theory of the firm. While both his
understanding of the firm and his suggested modifications of law constitute significant
contributions to the literature addressing the legal theory appropriate for a society dominated
by organizations, his failure to consider other theoretical constructs of the corporation binds
his analysis to a particular theory without any explanation of why this theory is appropriate.
215. Undoubtedly, the ultimate financial beneficiaries of corporate activity are individuals.
However, while an individual is at one end of the chain and a corporation is at the other, the
links between the two may include brokers, banks, mutual fund managers, index fund
managers, and others. Because the relational chain between corporations and individuals is
beyond the scope of this Article, I assume for purposes of discussion that corporations are
owned by individual shareholders.
216. See Dallas, supra note 45. Dallas makes a strong challenge to the traditional model of
corporate governance. She states that "[t]his traditional ownership model rests on the theory
that society should recognize the rights of shareholders to control corporations because the
shareholders have the incentive to maximize profits. This incentive causes them to utilize
factors of production most efficiently and to strive to maximize the satisfaction of human
wants." Id. at 19. She finds this traditional model to be inaccurate and develops what she
characterizes as the "power model" which "focuses upon the political nature of decision
making in the large corporation." Id. at 25. This power model suggests that the "the firm is
very much an actor in its environment that seeks to increase its discretion and autonomy by
decreasing its dependence on various constituencies.... The firm is not merely responsive to
an environment but acts to modify that environment." Id. at 26.
217. The ascertainment of appropriate societal priority appears to coincide with the view
expressed by Justice White in Bellotti that the Supreme Court should allow the legislature's
pronouncement to stand because it emanates from a First Amendment value and represents a
balance that the state legislature is more appropriately situated to decide. See supra notes 109-
11 and accompanying text.
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concerns will become even more descriptively questionable as the
chain between the corporation and the individual continues to grow,
by virtue of the greater "securitization"21 of investments. Also, the
movement from the management corporation to the truly multi-
national corporation will further attenuate this connection.21 9 This
trend supports the viability of a third perspective, of the corporation
provided by the corporation itself, as representative of neither individ-
uals nor government. Once the representational perspective is aban-
doned, efficiency analysis remains as the only applicable aspect of the
neoclassical economic approach.
Under the forgoing analysis, the only truly viable corporate con-
ception is the natural entity theory, given the descriptive weaknesses
of the fictional entity paradigm and the lack of harmony between the
normative goals of the First Amendment and the orientation of the
218. Securitization is typically used to describe the packaging of, for example, real estate
loans into instruments which are then sold as securities. See Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J.
Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1369, 1373-75 (1991). The authors describe a variety of financial transactions characterized by
the term "securitization," but they employ the following working definition:
the sale of equity or debt instruments representing ownership interests in, or
secured by, segregated, income producing asset or pool of assets, in a transaction
structured to reduce or reallocate risks inherent in owning or lending against the
underlying assets and to ensure that such interests are more readily marketable
and, thus, more liquid than ownership interests in and loans against the
underlying assets.
Id. Here I use the term to identify a similar phenomenon relative to stocks. Mutual funds and
equity futures are just two examples of the many ways that equity offerings are being repack-
aged and managed by institutions. These offerings have also been described as "equity deriva-
tive products":
"An equity derivative is a security or private contract whose cash value rises or
falls depending on what happens to the one or more stock or market indexes to
which it is tied. A derivative can be the form of an option, a warrant, a swap, a
bond, a certificate of deposit or any manner of hybrid."
Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest Challenge to
the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1319, 1322-23 (1991) (quoting Saul Hansell, Is the World
Ready for Synthetic Equity?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1990, at 55). Traditional insti-
tutional investment by pension funds and insurance companies has also stepped into a position
between actual individuals and corporations. Depending on the extent to which these institu-
tions and managers play an active role in handling equity investments and monitoring manage-
ments, we may see a reintegration of the ownership and control cleavage identified by Berle
and Means. See supra note 39.
219. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, Who is Us?, 90 HARV. Bus. REV. 53 (1990). Reich
discusses the actual distinction between the interests of multinational corporations and the
interests of there putative home country. There Reich points out that "the competitiveness of
American-owned corporations is not the same as American competitiveness." Id. at 55. This
greater scope surely provides an even stronger basis for the traditional fear of the corporate
form. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 106, at 372-75. Blumberg argues for the creation of a
body of "enterprise" law to supplement corporation law in the context of the multinational
firm. The basis for this argument is, in part, derived from the inconsistent application and
incomplete nature of corporate legal theory.
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aggregate paradigm. Notably, this approach garnered a majority of
the Supreme Court in both Austin and Bellotti.
V. CONCLUSION
The analysis of this Article advocates using a fictional entity con-
ception of the corporation when considering corporate free speech
issues. Given current state incorporation statutes, the market for cor-
porate control, and the impact of context on individual action, it
appears that a majority of the Supreme Court appropriately chose the
natural entity conception of the corporate persona as the foundation
for its corporate free speech analysis. The forgoing analysis indicates,
however, that the Court's failure to focus on a theoretical choice has
led to unnecessary dissention, uncertainty about the choice in future
cases, less confidence in the Court's reasoning, and less consistency
regarding its vision of the corporate persona. Nevertheless, this lack
of focus in no way undermines the significance of theory selection to
the Court's ultimate decision.
Three practical considerations suggest the importance of thor-
ough judicial explication of the underlying assumptions and concep-
tions involved in the regulation of corporate speech. First, a deeper
understanding of the Supreme Court's theoretical conception of the
corporation would aid future litigants and students in understanding
and predicting the Court's decisions. Part of the difficulty in under-
standing the Court's initial corporate free speech ruling in Bellotti
resulted from the Court's attempt to avoid formal consideration of the
corporate persona.
Second, a deeper understanding of its theoretical conception of
the corporation would help the Supreme Court to maintain internal
consistency in its resolution of similar cases. Analogies propounded
by litigants which compare dissimilar organizations, such as general
purpose corporations and advocacy corporations or labor unions,
could be rejected as simply lacking foundation.
Finally, as new and competing theoretical conceptions of the cor-
porate persona arise, this deeper understanding would assist the
Supreme Court in resolving future disputes. A better understanding
of the reasons for theory selection would allow the Court to deal effec-
tively with the presentation of new theoretical approaches, such as the
aggregate conception proffered in Austin. Clearly, the dynamic evolu-
tion of that theoretical construct called a "corporation" has not yet
come to an end, and as new visions or characterizations develop and
gain acceptance, the Court will need a basis for making distinctions.
Moreover, explicit consideration of the appropriate societal role
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for corporations is important today, and promises to become more so
as national borders recede in the face of global economic competition.
Controversies over the constitutional rights of corporations generally,
and their First Amendment rights more specifically, provide an
opportunity for defining the societal role of corporations. The
Supreme Court's attempts to dodge this question, which is necessi-
tated by logic and counseled by practical reasoning, serves no particu-
lar purpose. A greater understanding of what we mean by the term
"corporation" and why we have chosen that particular meaning
would help to identify the scope of corporate constitutional rights as
well as other issues involving their regulation.
